Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the coming of the Great War by Robert K. Massie
New York: Random House, 1991 ISBN 0394528336
This blockbuster of a book, which arrived with a splash in 1991, has left me strangely unsatisfied: there is no doubt that Robert Massie has written a highly readable, detailed, and interesting book about the maneuverings of both British and German politicians and royalty, and the construction of the British and German navies, from the later 1800s through to the declaration of war in 1914. The problem at the core of this book is that no matter how much the naval arms race between Britain and Germany affected relations between the two countries, in the end it had little to do with the outbreak of war per se. Therefore, what we have here are really two separate stories that do not meet, and a book with a misleading title.
That stated, this is still a book worth reading for a lively description of the personalities involved in both the naval and political worlds of the time, and of the differences in outlook of both Britain and Germany. Through these pages we see the development of England's strategy, from "Splendid Isolation", to the realization that preserving peace meant preventing German hegemony over the other great powers of Europe. German strategy was more confused, as it revolved to a much greater degree around the whims of one person, the Kaiser (who had a much greater role in foreign affairs than that bestowed on the British monarch). The tragedy for Germany was that Wilhelm II was by turns arrogant, blustering, indecisive, and prone to over-excitement. His desire for Germany to be a great power meant, in his eyes, competing with England, including on the high seas. This strategy was a fundamental mis-understanding of both British personality and strategy and was in the end fatal for both Wilhelm and Germany. In the same vein, British mis-understanding of the Germans and the Kaiser did not help defuse the situation.
Britain, through geography, history, and empire, was a sea-going nation. It's very survival in the Nineteenth Century relied on being able to ensure freedom of the seas for its marine activities. This need led to the "two power standard", whereby the Royal Navy wanted enough ships to defeat the combined might of the next two greatest sea powers combined. The naval development of Germany was based on two flawed doctrines - one, that to be a great power and be respected as such one needed a great fleet (not true: Germany was a great power owing to their military strength on land - they had no need of a navy to garner respect), and two, that the Royal Navy's strategy would be to blockade Germany (this was never a British intention, and would not have been possible in any case).
The British saw the development of the High Seas Fleet as solely aimed at themselves, and therefore as an existential threat to the survival of the British Empire. Once that thought became entrenched in the minds of the English Cabinet, they moved from being un-involved in European affairs, to developing an understanding (the Entente Cordiale) with France as a bulwark against German aggression. Prior to the existence of the German Fleet, Britain was not too bothered about war between Germany and France - after the fleet's growth, the thought of the Kaiser having control over France, and its fleet, could not be borne. Massie explains these tensions well, and also documents the points of friction that occurred between the great powers in Africa (Boer War, Fashoda, Tangier, Agadir), and the Balkans (Balkans War 1912).
In his vivid descriptions of statesmen, the reader is often struck by the irony that a great appreciation of the "other" was usually apparent. Thus many of the British, such as Haldane, had a great appreciation of German culture, and many of the Germans were Anglophiles. Even the Kaiser saw much to admire in Britain and her achievements (he was after all the grandson of Queen Victoria).
Massie, in 900 pages, gives us much detail of various policies and strategies on both sides, but fails to uncover any "smoking gun", or deep-seated antagonism that forespoke of the coming of War. In fact - as he points out - in early 1914 both England and Germany thought a more peaceful period was coming into being after the turmoil of the previous few years. Massie's description of the aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand is clear and concise and shows the duplicitous role played by Germany, as well as their complete inflexibility regarding their plans for war; a fatal, and dare I state foolish, mistake.
As a narrative history of the time, well fleshed-out with good character portraits and explication, I can recommend this book. As a ground-breaking piece of history, it doesn't add much to what already exists.
No comments:
Post a Comment