The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in Savage Conflict 431-404 BC by Donald Kagan
London: Harper Perennial, 2005 (first published 2003) ISBN 9780007115068
There is little doubt that Donald Kagan is one of the pre-eminent historians of Ancient Greece, and particularly the Peloponnesian War, about which he wrote a magisterial four-volume history. The book I am reviewing here is a distillation of that work and his scholarship, to provide a more easily digestible history for the non-academic reader. He has succeeded mightily in that task - this book is a wonderfully concise, yet at the same time comprehensive, narrative of the nearly thirty years of war between the two greatest Greek states, and the two ideologies that they represented.
Kagan has written a very readable history, adding his and others commentary on why events transpired as they did. There are a few things the reader can draw from this, things that reverberate throughout history. Athens, the democracy, and Sparta, the oligarchy, both had strengths and weaknesses that came from their method of governance. Athens had the benefit of support from its population for the war, support that was demonstrated each time a vote was taken. The flip-side of that support is that the polis could be swayed by demagoguery, as it was on occasion throughout the war. Kagan explains clearly that the doomed expedition to Sicily became so when Nicias tried to counter the demagoguery of Alcibiades by trying the rhetorical trick of expanding the expedition beyond what he thought the polis would accept. They did accept it, and the failure of that sortie was the beginning of the end for Athens.
The key to Athens' strength was its navy, which relied on two factors. The first was tribute from the Athenian Empire - most subject states paid for protection from the Athenian navy - money which paid for ships and sailors. The second factor were the crews themselves, members of a democracy, which gave them a stake in the outcome of a battle. These factors not only meant that Athens mostly had the biggest navy, but they also were better trained and more aggressive. Given that the Peloponnesian War was mostly a maritime venture, Athens had the upper hand most of the time. Therefore when they lost men and ships it was a disaster, and the final battle of Aegospotami when the fleet was destroyed, and there was not the funds to replace it, meant the end of Athens.
Sparta's strength was that it was willing to do deals with whomever might help them, including the Persians. It was Lysander in league with Cyrus who finally brought about the defeat of Athens.
What else do we learn in this book? That war has not changed in thousands of years: atrocities, betrayals, both over-confidence and cautiousness bringing about defeats, and failure to think strategically bringing down a state. Kagan notes in his conclusion the irony that shortly after the end of the war and Spartan victory Athens once again became a democracy, and Ancient Greece as it had been was overtaken by Persia and Alexander the Great....the futility of war...
Kagan deals with all of this very well - obviously Thucydides looms over the history of these events like a giant, but Kagan is not afraid to disagree with him when he feels the evidence shows that the great historian got it wrong.
The apparatus of this book is quite good - decent maps and index, a short but interesting bibliographic essay, useful notes and an interview with Kagan.
So in short, if you want an up-to-date, well written account of the Peloponnesian War I think it would be hard to go past this volume. Great to read alongside Thucydides.
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