The Little Field Marshal: A Life of Sir John French by Richard Holmes
London: Cassell, 2005 (first published 1981) ISBN 0304367028
Who has heard of Sir John French now? Virtually no-one, and yet at his peak he commanded the British Army on the Western Front at the beginning of World War One. This after a storied career in the cavalry, where he fought in Sudan and most famously in the Boer War (where he made his name), and stints as Inspector-General of the Army and Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). Richard Holmes' book is a thorough look at both the personal and military sides of a complex man who generated loyalty and disdain in almost equal measure.
French in many ways was not the typical cavalry officer of the late Victorian era. He didn't come from a privileged background, and in fact transferred to the army from a burgeoning naval career. He was a serial womanizer which quite often got him into trouble in his early years, and led to a long estrangement from his wife and his children. His passionate nature was something that surfaced again and again during his career; several times he threatened resignation to get his way on various issues.
French's first time in battle was during the campaign to relieve General Gordon in Khartoum, when he commanded a troop of cavalry against the Dervishes. He carried himself well, and this led to him becoming an important commander during the Boer War, during which he became a hero after leading several brisk cavalry actions against the Boers. He was a cavalryman through and through, very much a believer in the role of the cavalry to both reconnoitre, and to take advantage of any breakthroughs by the other commands. These tactics worked well in South Africa, but were useless in France a decade and a half later.
That intervening decade and a half is for me the most interesting part of the book. French went to work modernising the army as he saw it - in some ways visionary in imagining how it was to be deployed in a Continental war, and in some ways quaintly reactionary in his steadfast refusal to countenance the cavalry giving up their lances (to become, as he saw it, mere mounted infantry - a fascinating part of that debate was that Erskine Childers, of Riddle of the Sands fame, wrote a book opposing French's ideas).
It was during this period that French came up against the limit of his abilities. A good tactical commander of cavalry, he could not effectively make the leap from that level to the broader job of CIGS. He had no feel for, liking of, or skill at the staff work that was required to make the most effective use of large forces of troops. He was fortunate in South Africa that he had Haig under his command, who was an excellent staff officer (and a close friend until their falling-out in 1915). French was the type of officer that liked to lead from the front and leave the staff work to others.
This in many ways was to bring about his downfall in 1915 - he failed to grasp that industrialised warfare required an industrialised approach to logistics, manpower distribution and planning. He wasn't up to the task, but as Holmes points out it is unfair to judge him too harshly for the reverses of the British early in the war, as nobody really knew what the new warfare looked like. French was too optimistic about the ability of troops to attack, and couldn't take the long view of some of his colleagues, yet when he was sent back to England to command the Home forces, he had enough vision to pave the way for the creation of the RAF, as well as keeping up the numbers of trained troops for the Front.
French was Anglo-Irish in descent, and always loved Ireland. He had a part to play in the Curragh Incident, where again he didn't cover himself in glory as far as the politicians were concerned - French had a tin ear for politics, as well as for money (he was perennially broke). In 1918 he was sent over to Ireland to become Lord Lieutenant, to try and quash the incipient rebellion that bubbled through the country. French flattered himself that he understood the Irish, and thought that Sinn Fein was not actually a popular movement. He favoured military control, but felt he had not enough troops to enforce it. Once again he couldn't read the political tea-leaves and was on the wrong side of most of the decisions taken during his time there.
It was an adventurous life, and one that Holmes captures well. He has a lot of sympathy for French and is prepared to go into bat for him when necessary, but is not afraid to criticise his decisions and actions when required.
The best way to sum up the man is to quote from the final paragraph of this book - "French was not a great general. He was a brave man and a good cavalry leader, and cared deeply about his profession. But in many respects he never transcended the nineteenth century, and his attempts to solve the tactical and strategic conundrums of 1914-15 were fatally marred by his undisciplined intellect and mercurial personality. Yet he should not be allowed to sink, disdained, into oblivion. Even those who knew him warts and all agreed that, whatever his shortcomings as a tactician, strategist, or indeed politician, 'French, in the sacred fire of leadership, was unsurpassed...'"
Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell
