Showing posts with label Little Bighorn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Little Bighorn. Show all posts

Wednesday, 5 February 2014

Little Bighorn Special Part Two - E Troop, Documentaries, Mitch Boyer and Archaeology

Killing Custer : the battle of Little Bighorn and the fate of the Plains Indians by James Welch with Paul Stekler

New York : W.W. Norton, 1994                                ISBN 039303657X


The mystery of E Troop : Custer's gray horse company at the Little Bighorn by Gregory Michno

Missoula, Montana: Mountain Press Publishing Company, 1994         ISBN 0878423044


Archaeological insights into the Custer Battle : an assessment of the 1984 field season by Douglas D. Scott and Richard A. Fox, Jr. with a contribution by Dick Harmon

Norman, Oklahoma : University of Oklahoma Press, 1987       ISBN 0806120657

Custer's last campaign : Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn reconstructed by John S. Gray, Foreword by Robert M. Utley

Lincoln, Nebraska : University of Nebraska Press, 1991            ISBN 080322138X



As is often the case, one book leads to many others - my reading of Red Sabbath has taken me on a bit of a Little Bighorn odyssey. Having a childhood love of "Cowboys and Indians", which grew into a more mature interest in military history, the Custer Battle is something that I've long known about in a general way, having read a few treatments over the years. In 2003 I had the fortune of visiting the battlefield, and from time-to-time I've revisited my photos, and the material I got from the visitor centre, which includes a fridge magnet of the famous Cassily Adams painting Custer's last fight.

James Welch has a little to say about that painting, in his personal reflection on the Last Stand and what it meant in Indian as well as White Man history in Killing Custer. Welch is an Indian himself (Blackfeet), and brings that cultural base to bear on his writing. In the early 1990s he was hired as a scriptwriter by Paul Stekler to write a documentary for PBS that Stekler was filming. Stekler wanted to look at the Little Bighorn battle from a "new" perspective, balancing the White view with that of the Indians.

Welch, although having lived in Montana most of his life, had little interest in Custer before taking on this project, and had only been to the battlefield once (when he was admonished for eating at a National Monument!). While Welch is known for his novels that deal with the Indian experience, he recalls early in Killing Custer going to the movies in his youth and cheering the Cavalry, along with all the other Indians in the audience, which is an indication that this book is not a "standard" history.

And it's not - Welch intersperses writing about the battle with scenes from the making of the documentary, and the modern politics of the Little Bighorn battle and site - and it is a site with meaning for many. The Indians that now own the area, the Crow, were on the side of Custer at the time of Little Bighorn, as the Sioux had dispossessed them of these lands. That they were naive in thinking that by supporting the US Government they would get their land back is beyond doubt. Many of the Sioux were less naive - Welch shows that Sitting Bull and some of the other Sioux Chiefs called together the "Big Village" with the foreboding that this would be a grand finale to their way of life. When writing about the making of the documentary Welch describes interviewing Indians about the battle, and the thing that stands out from the exchanges is how close Custer and the Little Bighorn are to us: many of these Indians were talking about their Grandfathers, who had been in the thick of the fighting.

The Indian narratives of the battle historically  have been discounted as being too episodic and contradictory to be of any use to historians trying to recreate what occurred on that June day 138 years ago. In 1983, a grass fire at the battlefield led to a series of events that threw new light not only on the archaeology of the site, but on the relevance of Indian accounts of what occurred on that day. Gregory Michno has used the results of those digs, and a clear-headed look at the Indian and White oral/written evidence to try and clear up a mystery that had surrounded what happened to 28 bodies that were said to lie in the "Deep Ravine" of the battlefield. If you go to the field today, there are no markers in that place, and it was a mystery that intrigued Michno, who has made a valuable addition to the burgeoning literature of Little Bighorn.

His book is an excellent synthesis of available evidence - especially useful is the comparison of Indian evidence, which when read one after the other seems, if anything, less contradictory than that of the White witnesses. Gray's Custer's last campaign clearly shows that the much belittled testimony of Curley, one of the Indian scouts with Custer and the only survivor from his troops, is actually quite accurate. When read together, it is possible to piece together a fairly accurate picture of what happened on Battle Ridge that afternoon. The archaeological digs after the fire have allowed historians to more accurately chart the flow of the battle - it seems that the final stand was in fact on Custer Hill, after skirmish lines thrown out around the hill were driven back onto the troops on that feature.

Many other old controversies have been put to rest by the archaeological work that has continued beyond the initial 1984 excavations. The Indians were fairly well armed with modern weapons - given how many fighting Indians there were on that day, even a ratio of 25% of Indian combatants with firearms means Custer's men were out-gunned. The number of armed Indians increased as the battle progressed when they took arms from the dead soldiers: the evidence indicates more than one trooper was shot with his own - or a comrades - weapon. The last stand was most probably on Custer Hill, with the last survivors making a doomed dash for Deep Ravine and being cut down on the way.

Of course the controversies about Custer and his character will probably simmer on for ever: certainly he can be held accountable for not reconnoitring the village before his attack, but once committed, it now seems that the 7th Cavalry fought the way it knew how: the only problem was that the Indians were too many and too mobile a force to succumb to Army tactics. the question of whether Benteen could have changed the outcome by obeying Custer's order to advance is moot: he didn't, and his explanations of why he didn't must always be viewed through the prism of self-vindication. However, if Gray's estimate of  over1800 Indian warriors thronging the field that day is correct, perhaps Benteen chose wisely.

What is beyond dispute is that Custer's men - including his brothers Tom and Boston, his nephew and his brother-in-law - died, along with Mitch Boyer, who I haven't really mentioned in this review, but as described by Gray was a fascinating product of the age. While we'll never know Boyer's exact words, it seems he knew when he ordered Curley to leave the fight that no-one in the command would survive that day. Standing on the battlefield, knowing that, is a sobering experience.






Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell

Tuesday, 28 January 2014

Book Review - Little Bighorn Special Part One - Red Sabbath : the Battle of Little Bighorn by Robert Kershaw

Red Sabbath : the Battle of Little Bighorn by Robert Kershaw

Hersham, Surrey : Ian Allen Publishing, 2008 (2005)            ISBN 9780711033252


With some reservations (which I'll get into later), I can recommend Red Sabbath as the one book to read if you want to know what happened at the Battle of Little Bighorn - "Custer's Last Stand". Robert Kershaw has given us an up-to-date and accurate description of what was the US Army's greatest disaster in its wars against the Plains Indians.

Something has always fascinated me about Custer's last battle: given the amount of paper and ink given over to it, it seems that I'm not the only one. The tragedy of his demise along with most of the 7th Cavalry attains Greek proportions - hubris, courage, disaster - they are all here. I've had the fortune to visit the battlefield, and it's a very moving place, with grave markers scattered around the field indicating where the men actually fell (there are not many Indian markers on the battlefield, partly owing to lack of intelligence about where they fell, but also - as Kershaw points out - while over 260 US servicemen, civilians and scouts lost their lives at Little Bighorn, the Indian deaths probably numbered just over 40).

Red Sabbath is a book that is oriented more at the military side of affairs, with a detailed look at the command and control aspects of the battle, and more focused on the Government rather than the Indian side. The first chapters set the scene, with a detailed account of the Fetterman Massacre 11 years before Little Bighorn, and briefly taking us through the Laramie Treaty, and the underhanded way the US Government broke that treaty, which led to the three columns under Generals Terry, Crook and Gibbon entering the Powder River Country during May 1876.

By taking us through the details of the Fetterman engagement, and the "Wagon box fight" of 1867, Kershaw points out that the way for the Army to defeat Indians was to combine, stand, and fight: not disperse, scatter and run. In retrospect, that seems obvious, but in the ten years between those events and Little Bighorn, most Indian engagements involved the Army making contact and the Indians fleeing, so the strategy had developed of splitting Army forces - one force to engage, and the others to attack the fleeing enemy. Engagements since 1867 had been with small forces of Indians - usually less than 100.

The summer of 1876 was different. The Indians - usually moving in small tribal bands - had decided to take a stand. They called as many groups as possible together, both to provide safety in numbers, and to attack the Army en masse if they could. Another key development on the Indian side was their ability to gather together a large number of modern rifles, including many repeating rifles such as Henrys and Winchesters. These key facts had eluded the intelligence gatherers for the Army.

The vaunted 7th Cavalry was not what some of the old movies would have us believe. The Army was a last choice occupation in the 19th Century, and many of the regular soldiers were recent migrants, wastrels, or joined up only to desert when they had made it out West. Many of them were not great horsemen, and while their Springfield rifles were mostly reliable, accurate and had a long range, they were single shot (breech-loaded), and most of the soldiers were very poor marksmen, with only 15 practice rounds  per year allocated to each soldier.

The Army had other problems that summer as well: while we all know Custer as a General, that was a brevet rank given during the Civil War, and he had reverted to his substantive rank of Captain on the cessation of hostilities (he again held a brevet rank of Major General at the time of his death, but was a substantive Lieutenant Colonel). He was not the only officer in that situation, and with the size of the army greatly reduced after the Civil War, promotion was difficult to obtain. For a man with Custer's personality, that was hard to take, and he leaped at the chance to battle the Indians with the hope of a jump in his substantive rank. The officer over him, Terry, was aware of his chafing, and gave him a pretty free reign in carrying out his orders, which was not a good idea. In fact communication was a problem for this whole campaign, with Crook's forces severely tested at the Battle of the Rosebud some days before Custer's battle - if Crook had passed on some crucial facts such as the number of enemy gathered in the area, and their firepower, Custer may not have made some fateful decisions on the day of his battle.

And so we come to the 25th of June 1876. Custer and his troops were weary before the day began, desperate for a victory to end their constant marching. With no serious reconnaissance, Custer divided his command before heading out to do battle. The first surprise for Custer was the size of the Indian encampment. The second surprise was that they were standing and fighting rather than fleeing. The third surprise was that Custer's plan to circle around and support Reno was denied him by topography which had not been fully scouted before the plan was formulated. Custer then further divided his forces, refusing it seems to believe that the Indians could and would stand and fight against Army troops. To be fair to Custer he did think support was on its way. But that support was halted before it could get to Custer, with its inexperienced men, and officers not used to what was happening in front of them, both unwilling and unable to bridge the - what now seems almost unbearably short - gap between themselves and Custer's dwindling force.

The end came very quickly for Custer, as the Indians spared no-one, and made sure their bodies were useless in the spirit world by mutilation. This cultural practice made the discovery of the disaster the next day all the more horrific for Terry's men, and for the public as news of the disaster spread. What was to have been a great centennial victory over the savages had turned into a horror story.

Kershaw's description of the Battle is first rate: he has used some up-to-date research and Indian testimony to refute some of the earlier theories on how the battle progressed. His general style is easy to read and informative, and rarely slips into hyperbole. He does however sometimes slip into jargon, most noticeable when he is comparing the Plains Wars to modern warfare, and in particular modern peace-keeping missions. Why he felt he had to do this is a mystery, as in my view it adds nothing to the book, either in helping the reader understand Custer or modern peace-keeping.

This problem is an indicator, yet again, that books published under the Ian Allen umbrella lack a serious editorial presence. Kershaw would have benifitted greatly from that, as his  repetitions of key themes can verge on the tedious (how many times do we have to have explained in detail that the Indians tactics resembled that of a buffalo hunt?). Another criticism that I'd make is that the Bibliography seems a little odd - I'm not sure that it's a full one.

However those criticisms are minor in the wider scheme of this book - if you are interested in Custer and his final days, this book is well worth finding and reading. Recommended.



Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell