Book Review - Dreadnought by Robert K. Massie

 Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the coming of the Great War by Robert K. Massie

New York: Random House, 1991                              ISBN 0394528336

This blockbuster of a book, which arrived with a splash in 1991, has left me strangely unsatisfied: there is no doubt that Robert Massie has written a highly readable, detailed, and interesting book about the maneuverings of both British and German politicians and royalty, and the construction of the British and German navies, from the later 1800s through to the declaration of war in 1914. The problem at the core of this book is that no matter how much the naval arms race between Britain and Germany affected relations between the two countries, in the end it had little to do with the outbreak of war per se. Therefore, what we have here are really two separate stories that do not meet, and a book with a misleading title.

That stated, this is still a book worth reading for a lively description of the personalities involved in both the naval and political worlds of the time, and of the differences in outlook of both Britain and Germany. Through these pages we see the development of England's strategy, from "Splendid Isolation", to the realization that preserving peace meant preventing German hegemony over the other great powers of Europe. German strategy was more confused, as it revolved to a much greater degree around the whims of one person, the Kaiser (who had a much greater role in foreign affairs than that bestowed on the British monarch). The tragedy for Germany was that Wilhelm II was by turns arrogant, blustering, indecisive, and prone to over-excitement. His desire for Germany to be a great power meant, in his eyes, competing with England, including on the high seas. This strategy was a fundamental mis-understanding of both British personality and strategy and was in the end fatal for both Wilhelm and Germany. In the same vein, British mis-understanding of the Germans and the Kaiser did not help defuse the situation.

Britain, through geography, history, and empire, was a sea-going nation. It's very survival in the Nineteenth Century relied on being able to ensure freedom of the seas for its marine activities. This need led to the "two power standard", whereby the Royal Navy wanted enough ships to defeat the combined might of the next two greatest sea powers combined. The naval development of Germany was based on two flawed doctrines - one, that to be a great power and be respected as such one needed a great fleet (not true: Germany was a great power owing to their military strength on land - they had no need of a navy to garner respect), and two, that the Royal Navy's strategy would be to blockade Germany (this was never a British intention, and would not have been possible in any case).

The British saw the development of the High Seas Fleet as solely aimed at themselves, and therefore as an existential threat to the survival of the British Empire. Once that thought became entrenched in the minds of the English Cabinet, they moved from being un-involved in European affairs, to developing an understanding (the Entente Cordiale) with France as a bulwark against German aggression. Prior to the existence of the German Fleet, Britain was not too bothered about war between Germany and France - after the fleet's growth, the thought of the Kaiser having control over France, and its fleet, could not be borne. Massie explains these tensions well, and also documents the points of friction that occurred between the great powers in Africa (Boer War, Fashoda, Tangier, Agadir), and the Balkans (Balkans War 1912).

In his vivid descriptions of statesmen, the reader is often struck by the irony that a great appreciation of the "other" was usually apparent. Thus many of the British, such as Haldane, had a great appreciation of German culture, and many of the Germans were Anglophiles. Even the Kaiser saw much to admire in Britain and her achievements (he was after all the grandson of Queen Victoria).

Massie, in 900 pages, gives us much detail of various policies and strategies on both sides, but fails to uncover any "smoking gun", or deep-seated antagonism that forespoke of the coming of War. In fact - as he points out - in early 1914 both England and Germany thought a more peaceful period was coming into being after the turmoil of the previous few years. Massie's description of the aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand is clear and concise and shows the duplicitous role played by Germany, as well as their complete inflexibility regarding their plans for war; a fatal, and dare I state foolish, mistake.

As a narrative history of the time, well fleshed-out with good character portraits and explication, I can recommend this book. As a ground-breaking piece of history, it doesn't add much to what already exists.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Gallipoli by Alan Moorehead

Gallipoli by Alan Moorehead

London: Aurum, 2007 (first published 1956)           ISBN 9781845132392

It's appropriate on this day of all days that this is the book I'm reviewing. One hundred and two years ago, at dawn on 25 April 1915, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula as part of an Entente amphibious landing designed to take Turkey out of the War. The venture was a disaster for the Entente, as well as for the Ottoman Empire.

Moorehead's narrative of the campaign is still - sixty years after it was written - the ideal entree to the story for someone who knows little of what went on, or perhaps has a too Australian-centric view of what occurred in the eight months Entente troops were invested on the Peninsula.

While the landings in April and the battles thereafter were the blooding of the ANZACs, the preponderance of the landing forces were British and French troops, including many Indian and African regiments.

Moorehead's over-arching theme is one of missed opportunities on sea and land, and of poor decision making. It was British and French diplomatic bungling that brought Turkey into the war on the side of Germany rather than the Entente powers. Once this had occurred the Navy decided that if it could force the Narrows, Turkey would capitulate. They were not far from the truth in this - Moorehead paints a scene of a fractured and fragile Turkish government run by the Young Turks, and how the sight of a British battlefleet in the Istanbul Roads probably would have brought an armistice.

To achieve this outcome the ships needed to get through the Bosphorus. They so nearly succeeded. Just at the moment the Turks could no longer defend the straits with guns or mines, the British - shaken by their losses - decided that they needed an army to take the Peninsula by land, as they couldn't take it by sea alone. The respite allowed the Turks to recover somewhat while the British planned the landing.

The fact that the British did this planning in three weeks explains in part its eventual failure, although to get so many men ashore at all - it was until that time the largest amphibious operation ever - was a kind of success. The overall commander of the force, Hamilton, had a part in the failure as well. A man of poetic temperament and undoubted bravery, he was a leader who let his subordinates run their battles: a good trait, but Hamilton's lack of clear tactical objectives and orders led to much confusion on the battleground.

Despite the rushed planning and Hamilton's quirks, strategic victory on the first day was a near-run thing. Even though the ANZACs landed in the wrong place, and were faced with a maze of gullies and cliffs rather than the more easily sloping land they expected, some few managed to scale the heights before being thwarted at the last moment by Mustafa Kemal, whose ruthlessness and drive during the Campaign started him on the path to becoming Ataturk.

Although the beachhead was precarious, it held: the Entente forces were not strong enough to dislodge the Turks, and neither could the Turks repulse the invaders. The appalling loss of life that occurred during both the Entente and Turk attacks is chronicled well by Moorehead. The battles that have become the staple of Australian and New Zealand military history, such as Lone Pine, The Nek and others that have become bywords for bravery and sacrifice, are put into perspective by Moorehead by showing the greater moves that were going on around them. The landing at Suvla, which Lone Pine and The Nek supported, which was doomed to fail as Moorehead so clearly shows, was the last throw of the dice by the Entente; and after the failure recriminations began.

Both Hamilton and Churchill (who was the initial supporter of the Naval plan) paid the price of failure with their careers and for many other commanders Gallipoli was their last battlefront posting. For many more though it was a schooling ground of great importance, not the least of these "students" being Monash, Blamey and Morshead.

When the decision to evacuate was made it was done so with a heavy heart, and with the expectation that evacuating might cost anything up to forty thousand casualties. The fact that the entire Peninsula was evacuated with only a couple of dozen deaths was a triumph of careful planning: a terrible irony, as careful planning before the campaign began may have led to victory. As it was, the Entente gained nothing and lost tremendously both in men and material.

The Turks won a great victory, but still lost their Empire.

Moorehead tells this story exceedingly well: as a seasoned war correspondent he can portray battle with a skill that made his byline famous in World War Two, and as an Australian he brings much feeling to the description of ANZAC in particular. His ability to sum up a person or a stiuation in a few well-chosen phrases is remarkable and goes a long way to making his books compulsive reading. His choice of primary material is always apt and to the point, and while reading this book it occurred to me that Antony Beevor owes much to Moorehead.

If you want to know more about this episode of the Great War, this book is the perfect place to start.

[In respectful memory of Privates S.B. McGregor M.M. 2nd Field Ambulance, who landed at ANZAC Cove on 25 April 1915, and his brother James, 3rd Battalion, killed at Lone Pine in August 1915]

Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Pursuit : the sinking of the Bismark by Ludovic Kennedy

Pursuit : the sinking of the Bismark by Ludovic Kennedy

London : Fontana, 1975                       ISBN 0006340148

The Bismark was the pride of the Nazi German Navy. At over 800 feet long, she was the largest battleship in the world, and with her sweeping bow and elegant superstructure, she was certainly one of the most beautiful. At the time of her sinking in May 1941, she was also one of the newest big gun ships afloat, and one of the most potent. So when the Royal Navy heard that she had escaped the Baltic sea along with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, they were very worried.

Ludovic Kennedy's account of the hunt, chase, and final destruction of the Bismark is short and to the point - he jumps straight into the planning for operation Rheinubung, the Nazi plan to send surface raiders into the Atlantic to disrupt the allied convoys from America - and he unveils a few little-known facts along the way.

The Germans didn't manage to keep their breakout secret very long. The Swedish cruiser Gotland spotted the Bismark and Prinz Eugen and their attendant destroyers before they had passed The Skagerrak, and thanks to sympathetic members of the Swedish Navy, the Naval Attache at the British Embassy was radioing the information to the Sea Lords the same day.

The key to Bismark's success was her ability to get into the open Atlantic unscathed, and hopefully un-noticed. That this didn't happen was partly due to good intelligence work, and some mystifying decisions by the German Admiral Lutyens, who spent a day and a night in the fjords of Norway, which gave the British time to get some ships together to track her down.

Lutyens' failure to refuel while in Norway turned out to be his greatest error, but more of that later on.

Kennedy tells this story in an almost cinematic way, constantly changing viewpoints from the Allied forces, to the Germans, and back to land HQ of both sides. This style allows him to cover all the bases, and to keep building tension until the final denouement. He often relies on an "I was there" style, describing what crew might have been doing or even thinking during the interminable hours of the chase (Kennedy was a junior officer on HMS Tartar, a ship in Captain Vian's destroyer flotilla that harassed Bismark the night before she was sunk). Sometimes his turn of phrase is a little clunky, but his description of the last moments of HMS Hood send chills up the spine, and his description of the chaos on Bismark just before she went down is horrifying - there is no romance of the sea here.

Because he was a naval officer and a journalist, Kennedy has been able to combine his innate knowledge of the sea with his ability to find facts, and come up with some fascinating insights into - as is emblazoned on the cover of my paperback edition - "one of the great sea sagas of all time". For instance it is little known that one of the key allied weapons in the search for the Bismark - their Catalina float planes - were crewed by US airmen seven months before the US declared war on the Nazis. Another amazing fact is that a German U Boat, U 556, actually sailed in between the two capital ships of the Allied "Force H" - HMS Renown and HMS Ark Royal - but could not do a single thing as she had run out of torpedoes! Shortly after this incident the Ark Royal launched the torpedo bomber raid that crippled the Bismark's steering gear and sealed her fate.

The only reason those planes were able to reach Bismark was owing to her lack of fuel. She had to get to the French coast, and because she had not refueled when she had the chance, she couldn't move further into the Atlantic to outrun her pursuers. If she'd had that freedom of movement she might have survived, as she would not only have avoided the bombers, but also the battleships that finally sealed her fate. HMS King George V and HMS Rodney were perilously short of fuel themselves, and had to head straight for port before the blazing hulk of the Bismark was finally dispatched by the torpedoes of the allied destroyer flotilla. In some ways this fact make the fate of the Bismark even more tragic.

The story of the Bismark is indeed one of the great stories of naval warfare. Two great ships were lost, along with thousands of lives, and this engagement turned out to be the last great battle fought by ships of the line. Ludovic Kennedy has brought the story alive, and if you think you might like to know more about this interlude of World War Two - the entire saga from Bismark's sailing to sinking took only nine days - it's well worth hunting out this book in your local library or second-hand book dealer.

Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell