Book Review - The Little Field Marshal by Richard Holmes

 The Little Field Marshal: A Life of Sir John French by Richard Holmes

London: Cassell, 2005 (first published 1981)              ISBN 0304367028

Who has heard of Sir John French now? Virtually no-one, and yet at his peak he commanded the British Army on the Western Front at the beginning of World War One. This after a storied career in the cavalry, where he fought in Sudan and most famously in the Boer War (where he made his name), and stints as Inspector-General of the Army and Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). Richard Holmes' book is a thorough look at both the personal and military sides of a complex man who generated loyalty and disdain in almost equal measure.

French in many ways was not the typical cavalry officer of the late Victorian era. He didn't come from a privileged background, and in fact transferred to the army from a burgeoning naval career. He was a serial womanizer which quite often got him into trouble in his early years, and led to a long estrangement from his wife and his children. His passionate nature was something that surfaced again and again during his career; several times he threatened resignation to get his way on various issues.

French's first time in battle was during the campaign to relieve General Gordon in Khartoum, when he commanded a troop of cavalry against the Dervishes. He carried himself well, and this led to him becoming an important commander during the Boer War, during which he became a hero after leading several brisk cavalry actions against the Boers. He was a cavalryman through and through, very much a believer in the role of the cavalry to both reconnoitre, and to take advantage of any breakthroughs by the other commands. These tactics worked well in South Africa, but were useless in France a decade and a half later.

That intervening decade and a half is for me the most interesting part of the book. French went to work modernising the army as he saw it - in some ways visionary in imagining how it was to be deployed in a Continental war, and in some ways quaintly reactionary in his steadfast refusal to countenance the cavalry giving up their lances (to become, as he saw it, mere mounted infantry - a fascinating part of that debate was that Erskine Childers, of Riddle of the Sands fame, wrote a book opposing French's ideas).

It was during this period that French came up against the limit of his abilities. A good tactical commander of cavalry, he could not effectively make the leap from that level to the broader job of CIGS. He had no feel for, liking of, or skill at the staff work that was required to make the most effective use of large forces of troops. He was fortunate in South Africa that he had Haig under his command, who was an excellent staff officer (and a close friend until their falling-out in 1915). French was the type of officer that liked to lead from the front and leave the staff work to others.

This in many ways was to bring about his downfall in 1915 - he failed to grasp that industrialised warfare required an industrialised approach to logistics, manpower distribution and planning. He wasn't up to the task, but as Holmes points out it is unfair to judge him too harshly for the reverses of the British early in the war, as nobody really knew what the new warfare looked like. French was too optimistic about the ability of troops to attack, and couldn't take the long view of some of his colleagues, yet when he was sent back to England to command the Home forces, he had enough vision to pave the way for the creation of the RAF, as well as keeping up the numbers of trained troops for the Front.

French was Anglo-Irish in descent, and always loved Ireland. He had a part to play in the Curragh Incident, where again he didn't cover himself in glory as far as the politicians were concerned - French had a tin ear for politics, as well as for money (he was perennially broke). In 1918 he was sent over to Ireland to become Lord Lieutenant, to try and quash the incipient rebellion that bubbled through the country. French flattered himself that he understood the Irish, and thought that Sinn Fein was not actually a popular movement. He favoured military control, but felt he had not enough troops to enforce it. Once again he couldn't read the political tea-leaves and was on the wrong side of most of the decisions taken during his time there.

It was an adventurous life, and one that Holmes captures well. He has a lot of sympathy for French and is prepared to go into bat for him when necessary, but is not afraid to criticise his decisions and actions when required.

The best way to sum up the man is to quote from the final paragraph of this book - "French was not a great general. He was a brave man and a good cavalry leader, and cared deeply about his profession. But in many respects he never transcended the nineteenth century, and his attempts to solve the tactical and strategic conundrums of 1914-15 were fatally marred by his undisciplined intellect and mercurial personality. Yet he should not be allowed to sink, disdained, into oblivion. Even those who knew him warts and all agreed that, whatever his shortcomings as a tactician, strategist, or indeed politician, 'French, in the sacred fire of leadership, was unsurpassed...'"

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Slim the Standardbearer by Ronald Lewin

 Slim the Standardbearer: a biography of Field-Marshall The Viscount Slim by Ronald Lewin

Ware, Herts.: Wordsworth Editions, 1999 (first published 1976)  ISBN 184022214X

This is a workmanlike biography of an interesting man. The major part of the book focusses on Slims' Burma Campaign, which in a sense is right and proper, but I when I finished the book I felt a little short-changed, as Slim has written so well about that himself. I was hoping for a little more insight into the man than this book delivered, but it was still worth reading to remind oneself of what an extraordinary life he led.

The son of a failed businessman, Slim dreamed of an early age of joining the army, but funds (lack of) seemed to scupper that wish, until the advent of war in 1914. Despite the myth that Slim became a Field-Marshall from the ranks, he was actually commissioned immediately as a second lieutenant owing to his time spend before the war in the Birmingham University OTC (despite not being a student at the University - the first example of "Slim's luck"). He was sent to Gallipoli, where he was wounded: after his recovery he was sent to Mesopotamia to assist in the relief of Kut, where he was wounded a second time. 

After the war he was transferred to the Indian Army where he served with Gurkhas. It seems that this was one of the happiest times of his life - there was much low-level action against rebellious tribes, he met and married his wife, and slowly made his way through the ranks, impressing at Staff College in Delhi and at the Imperial Defence College.

Interestingly he also spent these years writing short stories for money (even though Lewin's book is only just short of a hagiography, Slim's nose for cash runs through the book, from ensuring expense accounts were suitably large, to augmenting his pension in any way he thought he could), which I think is a fascinating insight, although one that Lewin doesn't ponder too much.

Although he is famous for his campaigning in Burma in World War Two, he also served in Ethiopia against the Italians (where he was wounded yet again), and in Iraq, before being sent East. There, in Burma, he famously led the retreat back to India, and then the advance back to Rangoon, through a series of excellent strategic and tactical manoeuvres, and (with the close support of Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of the South East Asian Theatre) working his way through the politics of logistics, supply and recalcitrant commanders (Wingate, Stilwell).

This is the major part of Lewin's work, and he describes well what is required of someone commanding an Army, and how the fighting is just one part. It was in Burma that Slim's ability to get people to follow him, his ability to listen, to plan on the run, and to connect with the average soldier were so much on display. Burma in many ways was (and is) a forgotten campaign, and so Slim's capability has been lost in time as the European and Pacific Campaigns have garnered most of the glory. He was probably the best British field commander of the War.

After the War Slim finally got the job for which he had been destined for a long time - Chief of General Staff. It was a difficult time to undertake the role, with the Army moving from a wartime footing to understanding what it's role would be during the Cold War. Slim instituted many reforms during this time.

Then seemingly out of the blue he was asked to be Governor-General of Australia. He took on the role with gusto, and was again a trailblazer, being the first of the "modern" G-Gs, touring the country and being a force for unification, while trying to stay outside of politics.

His final years as Constable of Windsor Castle were ones of enjoyment and social activities, before his decline and death in 1970.

Lewin's book covers this all in appropriate detail, but with little verve or insight - there is a later biography by Robert Lyman which may be better than this one.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Good-Bye Dolly Gray by Rayne Kruger

 Good-Bye Dolly Gray: the Story of the Boer War by Rayne Kruger

London: Pan Books, 1974 (first published 1959)    ISBN 03300238612

Apart from (even in?) South Africa, how many of the combatant nations remember the Boer War of 1899-1902? My hometown has a magnificent memorial in the main street commemorating the 250 Victorians who died fighting in South Africa, but I'm sure most passers-by these days assume the memorial is to World War One if indeed they notice it at all.

The Boer War was the progenitor of many things: blockhouses and barbed wire entanglements, concentration camps, armoured trains, mounted infantry, and not least the participation of most of the Empire. Kruger's book, originally published when some combatants were still alive, is a good "traditional" narrative history of the conflict, covering the military and the political quite well, the social less so.

"The Boers said the war was for liberty. The British said it was for equality. The majority of the inhabitants, who were not white at all, gained neither liberty or equality." This quote from the final pages of the book is pithy, and is not far from the truth. The Great Trek, undertaken the generation previous to that fighting this war, was undertaken so that the Boers could maintain their independence from the British, who had taken the Cape Colony and Natal for their own. The Orange Free State and Transvaal were in nearly all senses independent states, which both sides found acceptable.

That is, until gold was discovered in the Transvaal. The rush brought many foreigners (Uitlanders) to the state, mainly British. Fearing loss of control, the Transvaal government restricted the franchise of non-Boers. The Uitlanders complained to the Crown. The British had long harboured a desire to unite their colonies with the Boer republics to create a South African state. They thought that supporting the Uitlanders in their claim for representation may be a way to achieve such an outcome via the franchise and demographic takeover. So, like many other wars and revolutions throughout history, the fundamental cause of the Boer War was essentially about taxation without representation.

Militarily, the British Empire was always going to win a long drawn-out struggle. The best the Boers could hope for was to make Britain pay such a price that they would make terms. Eventually this is basically what happened in 1902, when the Boers recognised the suzerainty of the English and South Africa became a reality, but the Boers maintained their culture and language and eventually gained political preponderance over the new territory via their own demographic takeover. The War spilled much blood and spent much treasure to only reach a position that could realistically have been negotiated.

The opposing military forces could not have been more different in 1899. The initial British force, under General Buller (whose reputation suffered an irretrievable collapse during this conflict owing to his caution and tactical blunders) might have been wearing khaki and carrying modern Lee Metford rifles, but were old-fashioned in other ways. Their huge columns, with baggage trains consisting of thousands of carts drawn by oxen, officers that ensured that they brought with them champagne, baths and other luxuries, were no match for the Boers. Boer mobile commandos, who lived off the land (supported by many residents), were incredibly mobile owing to their horsed infantry that travelled without impedimenta, and were tactically supple as everyone had a say in how battle was commenced and fought.

Unfortunately the unique structure of the Boer fighting force also became a weakness as the war developed. With no fixed military structure, Boers came and went from the battle-ground as they pleased, and each commando could decide to engage how it chose to, whether that supported Boer strategy or not.

The British eventually dominated the battlefield through combining two seemingly opposing principles, which they fused into a strategy which eventually brought the Boers to the negotiating table. The first was to create units that copied the Boer way of fighting: mobile columns of mounted infantry, lightly equipped, that could cover distance quickly to bring the enemy to heel. The second was the construction of thousands of blockhouses - small forts that linked together into a military fence across the country. By using the mobile columns to push the commandos onto the lines of blockhouses, the British eventually wore down the Boer forces so much that their will to continue fighting began to fail. The Boers had hoped since the start of the war that their cousins who lived in Cape Colony and Natal would rise in rebellion and support them. This support did not materialise even after the Boers "invaded" the Cape and caused much trouble there. This fact also helped seal the fate of the Boers.

The British, while eventually "winning", also paid a heavy price. As many wars have, the Boer War brought down a government, and also a way of governing. The many failures of both politics and military during the war led to the British public losing faith in the rule of the upper classes. The Liberals took over politics, and the British officer class, where commissions were bought rather than earned, was dismantled after the war by Kitchener, who was the modernising leader of the forces in South Africa.

Kruger's book lists a catalogue of military blunders, with the British consistently underestimating the capabilities of the Boers, and the Boers suffering from too much or too little caution, often failing to press home their advantage or fruitlessly attacking points that were too strong. Early in the war the Boers laid siege to Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberly. They failed to take any of these places, and if they had the war may have taken a different turn.

By the same token, if Buller had moved more decisively and had more tactical nous, the Boers may not have won their early victories and in fact might have suffered defeats that may have led to them putting down their rifles much earlier than they did.

Kruger spends a few chapters on the political aspects of the war, particularly in England, but glosses over the politics of the participation of the Empire in the war, as well as the politics of the Cape Colony and Natal during the conflict. While he describes the concentration camps, again it is a side-issue in this book to the descriptions of the military activity.

If you want to get a grip on the military progression of the Boer War, Good-Bye Dolly Gray (the title comes from a well-known song from the era) is not the worst place to start.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - England's Pride by Julian Symons

 England's Pride: the story of the Gordon Relief Expedition by Julian Symons

London: White Lion Publishers, 1974 (first published by Hamish Hamilton 1965)

ISBN 085617548X

Many years ago I, like tens of thousands of other Melburnians, emerged from the underground railway station at Parliament and walked past a statue of General Gordon on my way to work. Paid for by public subscription, it is an indicator of how shocking to the Empire his death was, and in how much esteem he was held. I wonder how many commuters today even know who he is?

Certainly in 1884 everyone in England knew him - a hero from his service in China, and seen as a moral exemplar owing to his efforts to eradicate slavery in Africa, "Chinese" Gordon seems the quintessential Victorian hero - doing good work in far-flung places, wildly eccentric, and a favourite of the Queen.

Gordon ended up in the Sudan mainly owing to Gladstone's unwillingness to spend money on a military intervention there. In fact he had decided that the Anglo-Egyptian force in Khartoum should be withdrawn, rather than face the forces of the Mahdi, who's rebellion was gathering strength. The newspapers were pushing for a relief force to be sent, but the Government decided that they could just send Gordon, hoping his cachet would be enough to enable an orderly withdrawal, assuage public opinion, and curtail any unnecessary expense.

Unfortunately for Gladstone and his government, Gordon was a poor choice for such an assignment. Firstly, Gordon was a Christian visionary: hardly a good choice to try and pacify an Islamic insurgency. Secondly, he followed his own path, revealed to him by God, as he thought. Sent to arrange a retreat he instead fortified Khartoum and set himself to withstand a siege.

Soon enough he was surrounded by Mahdist forces, and it was public opinion - whipped up again by the newspapers - that forced the Government to send an expedition to relieve Gordon and bring him safely back to Egypt. If the Mahdi was defeated in the process, all the better.... so much for saving money!

England's Pride is the story of the expeditionary force that was sent up the Nile to relieve Gordon: a story of success and failures, of battles and massacres, and of Victorian attitudes and characters such as Generals Wolseley, Buller and Stewart, Colonels Barnaby and Butler, Lord Charles Beresford and most famous probably today Kitchener, who played a minor but important role in what came to pass in 1884-5.

Once Gladstone was finally convinced that rescue of Gordon was needed, the army decided the best course of action was to trans-ship the force up the Nile in small whaling boats to a forward base at Korti, and then send a force across the desert on camel to Metemmeh before continuing on to Khartoum.

The story therefore is mainly one of logistics and movement rather than fighting: the logistics and movement were in fact bigger obstacles to the army than any of the Arab warriors that they met on the battlefield. Moving thousands of men up the Nile over multiple cataracts (some of which were at the time un-mapped) was a huge undertaking, requiring mammoth efforts not only from the troops themselves, by the boatbuilders who built over 400 whalers in quick time, and also the Canadian guides (voyageurs) who were employed to manoeuvre the boats up the river safely to their destination (which in great part they managed).

The provision of camels proved to be a major problem. There were never enough for the army's needs and those they did have became severely over-worked. In fact one of the main reasons that reprisal against the Mahdi's forces for his sack of Khartoum (which occurred two days before the first British steamer came in sight of the town) was discontinued was that the British had too few camels to engage in effective campaigning.

Symons maps all this out well, and also provides a good synopsis of the final days of Gordon and the battle of Abu Klea. He charts the fate of those involved in the expedition - who prospered and who didn't, and a useful chapter speculating whether there was any chance that relief of Gordon was ever a realistic prospect. Symons thinks that those who became scapegoats at the time were unfairly treated and concludes that if anyone was to blame, it was Gordon for not communicating his position effectively enough to Wolseley, and Gladstone for delaying his decision to send a relief force. Wolseley's army, all things considered, did about as well as it could have in the situation.

What struck me most in this retelling of a great Victorian epic was how the situation rings through the ages - vacillating politicians and bickering military leaders leading to disaster is a story as old as time, and as recent and tomorrow's news.

England's Pride is a solid exposition of an interesting, if now semi-forgotten, piece of Empire history.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Monty His Part in my Victory by Spike Milligan

 Monty: his Part in my Victory: War Biography Vol. 3 by Spike Milligan, edited by Jack Hobbs

Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978 (first published 1976)          ISBN 0140045031

It is arguable, but it's quite possible that Spike Milligan was the funniest human being in history. I have grown up with him, listening to The Goon Show in my early years, the Q shows, and buying into his absurdist humour, which is slowly fading from herd memory (the amount of people in a crowded room that "get" a Milliganism when it's dropped is getting fewer and fewer and time marches on).

For some reason I never got around to reading his biographies of his time spent in the army in World War Two - formative years for him in a creative sense, but also very traumatic. I read the first part  which covered his entry into the forces and training, and now for some reason am reading the third part, which deals with his time in Africa after the defeat of the Axis in Tunis (I think Spike would approve of reading his four-part trilogy out-of-order).

This book - highly and funnily illustrated - is a collection of vignettes of an army at rest after victory, enjoying the spoils of war (i.e. getting drunk as much as possible), and of Milligan's membership of the Battery Concert party, the beginnings of the surrealist mayhem that became The Goon Show.

This volume did not make me laugh out loud as much as volume one, but was still well worth an hour or so's time.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Rorke's Drift by Michael Glover

 Rorke's Drift: a Victorian Epic by Michael Glover

London: Leo Cooper, 1975                                                ISBN 0850521823

This book has exceed expectations for me: I often find Leo Cooper/Pen&Sword books can be very militarily "geeky", diving down the rabbit-holes of equipment or drill, minute descriptions of tactical movements, which make the books of value only if the reader already has broader knowledge of the incident or battle in question. Thankfully Rorke's Drift does not fall into that category.

Although this is a short book (less than 150 pages) Glover has not only given us a blow-by-blow description of the action at Rorke's Drift, but also a close description of the disaster at Isandhlwana earlier in the day, and a concise exposition of the history of Southern Africa that had led to the situation where Cetshwayo's Impis attacked the British after they had crossed the Buffalo River into Zululand.

Glover well describes how it was as much British public opinion at home as it was activity on the ground that drove the British to expand their hold on Natal, which impinged on the Boers and also the Zulus, who were finding that the Boers were impinging on their land. The Zulu tribe had emerged as a successful warrior force, and their social structure almost required them to engage in battle (warriors had to have "washed their spears" in blood before they could marry).

In the clashes between Zulu and Boer, the British, given the times, naturally leaned toward supporting the white man over the black, and so gave an ultimatum to Cetshwayo to disband his army, something that he couldn't and wouldn't contemplate. That ultimately was the reason Chelmsford crossed the Buffalo in January 1879.

Glover explains quite clearly how the Zulus defeated the British at Isandhlwana - a combination of poor leadership, and poor use of the country doomed the British column - in open ground and in loose formation, less than two thousand British troopers armed with Martini-Henry rifles could not but succumb to an estimated 15,000 Zulu warriors. Conversely, in a well-led defense of a well-fortified position, approximately 150 British troopers could fight off 4,000 Zulus. Glover explains that it was much safer for the garrison to stay put than try to run, as in the open all the advantages lay with the Zulu warriors, but in a fortified position, the advantage lay with the British.

I won't go into the detail of Glover's description of both battles, other than to state they are well-written, clear, and concise. Along the way he puts paid to some of the images that might be in the reader's head from the movie Zulu (although the battle scenes do ring true). Bromhead was not young, and he and Chard worked well together from the start. The 24th Foot was a regiment of experienced and hardened soldiers. And Private Hook, far from being a shirker, was an out-and-out hero during the battle (and he was also in real life teetotal!).

Glover's final chapter looks at the politics surrounding the battle - the heroic stand at Rorke's Drift covered up for the disaster at Isandhlwana and so was boosted by those who's careers could have been ended by the loss of the first battle. There is no doubt that incredible heroism was shown by the members of the garrison, but one wonders whether the award of eleven VCs wasn't at least in part influenced by factors other than those which occurred during the Battle. Glover also makes clear the heroism of the Zulu warriors, who time after time flung themselves forward into a rain of bullets.

So, if you want a short history of the battle, and one that sets it in full context, and is good reading, I can recommend this book.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Battles of the Falklands War by Gordon Smith

 Battles of the Falklands by Gordon Smith

London: Ian Allen Ltd, 1989          ISBN 0711017921

This is a somewhat dry, but very useful book. Built around 40 maps, the book is a day-by-day account of the invasion of the Falklands and South Georgia by the Argentinians, the build-up of the British task force and their arrival in the conflict zone, and the battles naval, aerial and on land that led to the British victory. There is a potted history of the Falkland Islands at the beginning of the book, appendices at the end covering British awards for Gallantry, British ships lost and damaged, British and Argentinian air losses, and a useful bibliography.

Even though this could be almost classed as a reference book, there is still much to be gleaned and learnt about this short and vicious conflict, one that almost seems to have been forgotten these days. Not emphasised in this book, but still obvious, is the weather. In the middle of the Atlantic, at 51 degrees south, the weather even in summer can be treacherous, but in May and June, when the major battles of the war took place, the seas are rough and the land is cold and blizzard-prone. It's not mentioned in this book, but surely the Argentinian leaders assumed that by invading in April, the weather would be a protection from quick action by the British to re-take the islands.

They were so very wrong in thinking that. The British very quickly mobilized naval and land forces to head down to face the Argentine forces. This was a huge logistical effort, undertaken very quickly, and it is a credit to those that organised and undertook those logistical operations that they managed to transfer thousands of troops and dozens of ships and aircraft, and all the ancillaries, ammunition, food and fuel required so quickly, generally in an efficient manner.

That this was a battle about control of sea and air space was clear to the British command, but perhaps less so to the Argentinians (this book is written from the British viewpoint, so the reader gets little to no insight into the strategies, tactics or thinking of the Argentine side). From the sea point of view, the British would have thought that they had the advantage, which in the end proved to be the case. Although the Argentinian Navy was quite large, and did have some modern ships (ironically their modern ships were made by British shipyards), mostly they were older (the General Belgrano was an ex USN WWII cruiser) and had limited capacity against the modern ships of the RN. While the sinking of the Belgrano was shocking and controversial at the time it happened, strategically it made perfect sense: the Belgrano, with its 6 inch guns, could have made short work of the British carriers if it had got within range, but more importantly its sinking had the effect of sending the rest of the Argentinian Navy back to port for the rest of the war. This had a huge effect on not only the Argentinian ability to interdict and fight the Royal Navy, but to assist the Army troops on the Islands.

The battle for airspace was much more contested, and was a much more even fight. The British side were hamstrung by their very limited number of fighter and attack aircraft (approximately 40 Harriers/Sea Harriers), and no AEW capability. The Argentinian side were hamstrung by the distance from their bases to the Falklands, which left them very little time for battle flying once there, and the fact that the British carriers could position themselves much closer to the active area while being out of range to any Argentinian 'plane. It's fair to state that it was in the air where Argentina had its biggest successes - while not managing to down more than one British fighter (others were destroyed by ground fire or accident), they did manage to sink seven ships, several helicopters, and do other damage to naval vessels and on the ground. In achieving this, they lost over 50 aircraft, losses which were unsustainable and led to air attacks reducing as time went on.

In the end, after a few nasty battles, the Argentine garrison surrendered, not because they thought they couldn't fight, and fight well, but with the realization that without supply and support from the Navy, and with diminishing capacity of the Air Force to assist, the end was inevitable. The Argentinian commander onsite disobeyed the Junta in Buenos Aires and surrendered, thus no doubt saving many hundreds of lives on both sides.

Battles of the Falklands War is not a true history, but rather a chronology and as such doesn't go into the whys and wherefores of the battle. But there are things that we can glean from this sorry bit of history, some of which resonate now in 2023, more than forty years later. One is that undemocratic dictatorships eventually drown in their own dreams of power and glory, another is never dismiss democracies as unable to stand up to naked aggression, and the third is that, quite often, logistics win wars.

If you would like to know what happened when and to whom in the Falklands War, this book is worth fishing out. If you are after a more rounded history of the conflict, there are better books to read.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Passchendaele: the Story Behind the Tragic Victory of 1917 by Philip Warner

 Passchendaele: the Story Behind the Tragic Victory of 1917 by Philip Warner

London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988 (first published 1987)    ISBN 0283997451

This book, for me, was like the curate's egg - good in parts. As a blow-by-blow account of the campaign to take the Passchedaele ridge near Ypres, the book is serviceable. As an insight into broader strategy it is patchy. As a definitive story of one of the bloodiest episodes of World War One it is definitely not the final word.

For those after a brief rundown of the battles that together become what we know as Passchendaele, the Wikipedia article is excellent. This book adds colour to  something like that article, but not much more meat from a historical perspective. Which is not to sell Warner's work short - He describes the actions that led to many of the Victoria Crosses won during the campaign, and his judicious use of letters and diaries adds an important element of verity to the book. I found his selections particularly interesting, as many of them were not the usual writings of soldiers or officers, but from medical staff and those at GHQ. 

So, we have a book that does a reasonable job of describing the progress of the battles, and effectively uses commentary of the time to tell us what it was like to be a part of the fighting and how soldiers survived the horror. It is when Warner moves to broader themes that I think this book struggles. 

Warner can't bring himself to decide whether Haig was a dunce, or just one among many other like-minded generals. What Warner fails to enunciate is just how Haig (or anyone else) would go about the battles of World War One differently. We can look back and pick holes in what happened, but with the knowledge and technology of the time, were there actually any alternatives to the type of mass attack that was normal during this campaign? Warner provides no conclusions, and does not, I think, emphasise that British tactics were indeed changing, and by the end of the battle they   had hit upon methods against which the Germans could not defend.

What Warner does emphasise is the effect of the weather on the progress of the battles, and on the misery suffered by those involved. He points out that the constant artillery barrages destroyed the intricate drainage system that was important in stopping the land becoming waterlogged. This was compounded by the unseasonal amount of rain that fell during most of the campaign. In the end, the mud became almost as much of an enemy as the Germans.

And what of the strategy behind this campaign? Warner is equivocal about Haig's stated reasons for going ahead with such a large campaign. He dismisses the aim of getting to the coast to capture the U-Boat bases as so much hot air, deprecates the idea of a battle of attrition, and grudgingly accepts that the British needed to take the pressure off the French after the mutinies of 1917. However, I think that all three of these strategies made sense at the time. Haig may have been getting a false idea of German capability and morale (Warner is particularly scathing of Charteris in this area), but Warner himself, in a chapter devoted to German reaction to the campaign, shows us that the continued onslaught of the British did almost crack the German lines, and will to resist. The campaign also stopped Ludendorff from moving troops to crush Russia, and from assisting Austria against the Italians. It is easy to criticize Haig, but his options were to work in the situation he was in, and with the information he had.

Passchendaele was a terrible disaster for so many. The casualties were appalling - over half a million casualties from July to November. Those casualties  included my great-grandfather, who was killed on 20 September 1917, in what came to be known as the Battle of Menin Road.  I, and many others like me, read to try and understand. Warner's book is useful in understanding what it may have been like to be in Flanders in 1917, but on the larger themes I would be looking elsewhere for satisfaction.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia by Phillip Knightley and Colin Simpson

 The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia by Phillip Knightley and Colin Simpson

London: A Panther Book, 1971   (First published 1969)

This is a solid work of journalism, in which Knightley and Simpson investigate the life of T.E. Lawrence using information that had recently come to life, from de-classified documents and testimony of friends and those who worked with him both in Arabia, and in England after the War.

What do we learn about this most enigmatic hero? Firstly, that he was not necessarily the idealistic seeker for Arab freedom that he portrayed in his writings. He was a soldier of the King, and used his undoubted charisma and intelligence to inveigle the Arab Revolt to work for the Entente war effort, all the while knowing that it was extremely unlikely that any Arabs would have self-determination in their or his lifetime.

Secondly, that despite his desire to return to the anonymity of the ranks after the end of Versailles, he could not help but to get involved in policy, particularly the development of the RAF. He was always scheming, plotting and writing letters to the head of the Force (Trenchard), MPs, or even the likes of Lady Astor. While sometimes his meddling was not welcome, others of his ideas continue today; he basically invented the idea of air sea rescue, and designed many of the early rescue launches of the RAF.

Thirdly - and perhaps today less shocking to the reader than it was when this book was written - was that Lawrence suffered depressive illness throughout his life, and the guilt he felt over his actions led him to engage in masochistic acts, both when he was in Arabia, by pushing himself beyond endurance, and back in England, where he degraded himself by serving in the ranks, and by having people beat him with a birch. The torturous stories he invented to justify his birching, especially those given to John Bruce, show a man at the end of his tether.

It was the Arab revolt that in many ways destroyed Lawrence, even as it was the making of him as a public figure. Not only the warfare in the desert, but the (to Lawrence) shamefulness of his lying to Faisal and Hussein and the act of writing Seven Pillars of Wisdom all took a heavy toll on his psyche. He had plans for other literary works, but his death only ten weeks after being discharged from the RAF put paid to that.

Knightley and Simpson also attempt to clear up the identity of S.A., to whom Seven Pillars of Wisdom is dedicated. They fairly convincingly conclude that it was Lawrence's friend Salim Ahmed, who was known as Dahoum. What they failed to get to the bottom of was Lawrence's sexuality; it seems he was sexless. There are also questions about his infamous night in Deraa, or at least the version of it as portrayed in his writings, with which some of the known facts conflict. It seems, from investigation, that Hacim Muhittin Bey was aggressively heterosexual, and would seem an unlikely instigator of buggery. Given the conflicting accounts, I do wonder whether Lawrence couldn't bring himself to write that he was raped by mere rankers, and had to inflate his attacker's status to that of Governor.

Overall then, this book is a good counter-factual to the story that Lawrence would have liked us to believe was true. In no way does it diminish his status as a hero of World War One, but it does bring us the complete man much more than we see in his own writings. If you can hunt out this book, and you are interested in Lawrence of Arabia, then it's well worth reading.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Adolf Hitler: my part in his Downfall by Spike Milligan

 Adolf Hitler: my part in his Downfall by Spike Milligan

Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971                ISBN 0140035205

Like many others who love pure anarchic comedy, I love Spike Milligan...from The Goons, through his television shows, to his writing, his surrealistic take on life has given me more joy than I can express. So why has it taken me so long to read this book? I really don't know, but it's been a wonderful escape from the pre-Christmas mayhem that is swirling around me.

Spike writes in his preface that despite "garnishing some of them", "[a]ll the salient facts are true". And that being the case, it's no wonder that on a few occasions he wonders how the Allies ever won the War. This book is the first volume of what was to be a trilogy that describes his service from joining up to demob (it ended up being seven volumes...maybe that was part of the joke?). Adolf Hitler... describes his time from being conscripted to arriving in Algiers - so 144 paperback pages of a war memoir that involves no fighting....well, no fighting the Germans....

What the reader does get is an insight into the beginning of Milligan's career in comedy. He was definitely an unusual character, and one gets the impression that the only way he could cope with the inanity, absurdity and stupidity of being in the Forces was to make fun of it all. In this he was ably assisted by his good friend Harry Edgington, who together with Spike formed the nucleus of a regimental jazz band that seemingly was kept quite busy in Bexhill and other places around the traps as the regiment trained for it's eventual debut in action.

Adolf Hitler... is a memoir of vignettes, most often funny, but interspersed with some more serious, that speak of the looming cost that was to come for the regiment, and of the folly of war. Milligan's style, to lampoon what was in fact the most serious thing (after all, someone is actually going to get killed doing all this), has a certain piquancy given we know that he struggled with depression for the rest of his life.

That stated, this is a book that will make you laugh out loud. How can I not recommend Milligan?

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Crimea by Orlando Figes

 Crimea: the Last Crusade by Orlando Figes

London: Penguin, 2011 (first published 2010)    ISBN 9780141013503

Within ten kilometres of my home I can travel down Raglan Street, Cardigan Street and Malakoff Street on my way to either Redan or Sebastopol. If I like, I can drive a couple of hours west to Panmure, or if I chose to drive north-west I can have a coffee in St. Arnaud. If I drive south-east for an hour or so to Melbourne I can travel down Inkerman Street and Alma Road to the suburb of Balaclava. That all these names are linked to the Crimean War tells me not only the time period when these suburbs and streets were coming into being, but what a huge effect this conflict had on the public opinion of Britain and her empire at the time.

And yet who has heard of that war these days? Given the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is timely to revisit this period in history, for it can inform the bystander of some of the issues that underlie today's conflict. Thankfully, we can read this well-written book by that great student and historian of recent Russian history, Orlando Figes.

Figes not only writes about the tragedy of the fighting, but of the deeper religious, colonial and territorial claims that drove this war, as well as writing an interesting and useful chapter on the legacy of the war (and yes, a couple of the places listed above get a mention).

As Figes writes in his introduction "each power entered the Crimean War with its own motives." The Turks were fighting to hold on to their European empire. The British were fighting ostensibly to save the Turks from Russian aggression, but actually to try to contain Russia (whose expansion they feared), and garner more trade with Turkey. Napoleon III fought for the glory of France, and also perhaps to create a Europe of nation-states that would look to him as an elder statesman. 

And what of Russia? Well, as Figes states "As for the Tsar, Nicholas I, the man more than anyone responsible for the Crimean War, he was partly driven by inflated pride and arrogance, a result of having been tsar for twenty-seven years, partly by his sense of how a great power such as Russia should behave towards its weaker neighbours, and partly by a gross miscalculation about how the other powers would respond to his actions..." sounds kind of familiar, doesn't it...

Ostensibly the War began when Russia took umbrage at how the Turks were treating Christians in the Holy Land. This led the Tsar not only to bully Turkey, but to invade the Danubian delta, with an idea to "free" the Slav Christians from the Muslim yoke. His actions raised the ire of both Britain and France. Britain had long been concerned that Russia's access to the Black Sea was a strategic arrow pointed at the heart of British trade and power in the East. France was concerned not only for the continuation of Catholic Austria (with her quarrelsome Orthodox subjects), but also for the rights of Catholics in Palestine. Their concern for the plight of Turkey came a very poor last in this race of self-interest. And so both the British and the French sailed to the Crimea, where with their superior technology and better-trained armies they quickly put the port of Sevastopol to siege, and almost as quickly they began to lose huge amounts of soldiery to disease and cold. The viciousness of the fighting, both in the field at the Alma, Balaklava and Inkerman, and during the siege, is well-covered by Figes with apposite quotes from journals and newspaper reports from the time.

Figes also covers the politics of the War, especially in England, where newspaper reports for the first time played a big part in how the public reacted to and indeed shaped the policy of the Government. There were many aspects of the Crimean War that made it the first modern war - newspaper reporting, modern rifles (both the French and the English had them and the Russians did not, which turned the tide of many of the battles), and the development of modern logistics, which were needed for the British and French to continue the siege.

The siege of Sevastopol perhaps doesn't seem as present to English-speaking peoples who think about the Crimean War as the Charge of the Light Brigade or Florence Nightingale, but to the Russians, it is a sacred event and memory - similar in scope to the Australian view of Gallipoli. Figes points out in his epilogue how the partition of the USSR in 1991, which meant that the Crimea and Sevastopol were no longer part of Russia, was traumatic for the Russian people and for Putin, unbearable.

Yet for Alexander II, who succeeded his brother during the War, once Sevastopol had fallen there was little point in continuing a war he knew he could not win. While the English war party, led by Palmerston, wished not only to continue the War but to expand it, the English public, horrified at the loss of life, felt that the taking of Sevastopol meant victory was at hand and that the troops could come home. Napoleon similarly was looking for a way out, which the fall of Sevastopol gave him.

And so the peace conference, which included Austria as well as the four belligerents, tried to give something to everyone. Britain came out of it with a Black Sea that was Russian-fleet-free, France came out of it with the Austrian and Turkish empires intact, and a commitment to assistance in Italy, the Austrians  gained an assurance that their own Orthodox subjects would not be stirred to revolt by the Russians, and the Russians could save face through the assurance that Orthodox rights in the Holy Land would be upheld by the Ottoman Empire. For the Ottomans, despite being the victim of the Russian attack that began the war, very little good came from the "victory". Their territorial integrity was restored for the moment, but they were subject to many restrictions on how they could govern, mostly concerning giving freedoms to their Christian subjects. These freedoms, and the imposition of western "aid" and "trade", led to a backlash from more traditional parts of society, while the Christians continued to mobilize for independence, with the acquiescence, if not actual assistance, of most of Christian Europe

No-one knows how many died during the War, but estimates range up to 800,000 soldiers and civilians. Many of these people died horribly from wounds, disease or the cold. A lot of the deaths could have been prevented with proper hygiene and medical attention, which was sadly lacking in both the British and Russian armies. Figes records the advances made by those armies during the War, along with the quirks that siege warfare brought to the Crimea (if you had the money, you could buy French Champagne from Fortnum and Mason's at Balaklava, along with any other luxuries you might require).

That Figes manages to weave such stories through his narrative while still enlightening us about grand strategy and battles both on the field and back "home" is one of the strengths of this book. I can't think of a better way to get up to speed on a period of history that needs further exploration in these current times. Recommended.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Seven Pillars of Wisdom by T.E. Lawrence

 Seven Pillars of Wisdom: a Triumph by T.E. Lawrence

Harmondsworth: Penguin Books in association with Jonathan Cape, 1975 printing

(First published privately in 1926, first published by Jonathan Cape in 1935, and by Penguin in 1962)

ISBN 0140016961

I first read Seven Pillars of Wisdom at university, which is when I suspect many young men read it, at least in the 70s and 80s, when the book had almost a cult status with those who would like to think they were in some way intellectual. Like many others of impressionable age at an impressionable time in their lives, I was very impressed by it. I still have the copy I purchased second-hand in the Monash University co-op, and I note that I paid the then (for me) princely sum of five dollars, which was the equivalent of several beers or a decent meal at that stage in my life.

I had always intended re-reading the book, but have been put off the task over the years by the notion that it was a book for young men, and that those wearied by the natural cynicism of age had found it just so much twaddle when they went back to it. That was my father's advice to me as well, and I didn't want to destroy my good opinion of the book. But then lockdown hit, and I've had a bit of a project to read some classic works, so I decided to bite the bullet and risk destroying an icon after watching an interesting television documentary about Lawrence that got me thinking about him, and Seven Pillars.

Is it as good as I remember? No. Is it just so much twaddle? No. Is it a great classic? Of that I'm not sure. It is definitely more than an exciting narrative of someone's wartime adventures, but it is also definitely less than a great work of literature. What it most definitely is, is an insight into the complex and difficult character that was T.E. Lawrence.

Seven Pillars of Wisdom, ostensibly about the Arab Revolt and the consequent battle of the Arabs against the Turks from Medina to Damascus, is actually about the wish-fulfilment of Lawrence's dreams to become famous, by whatever means became open to him. He admits as much several times in the book, while going on to admit that in fulfilling his wishes, he destroyed his soul through lying, killing, and the degradations that came to him during the campaign.

His opportunity, which came about when he was appointed liaison and intelligence officer to Feisal, became a legend, and he burnishes the legend (while seeming to deprecate it) in this book. He claims to run not only the Arabs, but also the British intervention in their theatre of war, explaining how his intelligence and forward thinking ran rings not only around the Arabs, who he describes as petty and unthinking, but also the British staff officers, who in his eyes are hide-bound and old-fashioned.

The book is a series of descriptions of his travels throughout the theatre, and some of the actions in which he took part, and of some of the characters he met along the way. Anyone who agreed with him, or fell in with his ideas, is painted glowingly, and those that didn't are not. The best parts of the book are his descriptions of his travels through the Hejaz and Jordan, with his writing placing the reader on the back of the camel with him, feeling his tiredness and hunger, and elation at arriving at a well-watered camp.

It is when he switches to mystic mode that the book suffers. Like many young idealistic men, his ideas about the beauty of man's struggle, of the meaning of war and society, and of the differences between men are incohate and hard to decipher in any meaningful way. He wishes to bring the Arabs into their hegemony, and so tries in his writing to make them more than they were: to create castles and kings from tents and wandering nomads. 

There is no doubt that Lawrence was a troubled soul. His upbringing was harsh, and sexually he was not classifiable, and there are passages in Seven Pillars of Wisdom where he revels in the degradation forced on him through his wanderings with the Arab tribes. He seems to have a theory that beauty and truth are unobtainable in the physical world, and so one should eschew the physical and in fact try and destroy it. There is no doubt in my mind that by the end of the campaign Lawrence was suffering mentally from his trials, and he just made it over the line in Damascus, so that the prize that he had been hoping for came to him as a bitter fruit indeed.

His mental state was definitely affected by his capture torture and rape in Deraa, which I think led not only to him hating the Turks, but also to hating the Arabs. In a strange way the reader gets the feeling that Lawrence almost felt that he'd deserved such punishment, and after the incident on several occasions the reader finds Lawrence uncaring about whether he lives or dies.

It struck me while reading the book that Lawrence is very much a precursor to the modern age, and the modern person. It is all about him, everything is done according to his plan, and other people are just so many chessmen to be placed on the board. It strikes me that Lawrence would have been a natural on social media, an influencer and icon.

There is no doubt that Lawrence hoped that Seven Pillars of Wisdom would become a great classic - a classic of endurance, of struggle and overcoming, and of the mystical beauty of a people and their history. That he failed in achieving that I think he knew, and we know as well. However, it is still a fine book, a worthy book, and no doubt a book that will continue to inspire those young men who find it at the right time in their lives.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - The Great War by Les Carlyon

 The Great War by Les Carlyon

Sydney: Picador, 2007  (First published 2006)           ISBN 9781405037990

It's only after finishing this book that I have realized why I have been feeling melancholy  for the last week. The Great War is a distillation of tragedy and waste: 800 pages of sadness. Les Carlyon used all of his skill to portray the story of the Australian Army on the Western Front, both from the view of the soldier at the front, and the commanders behind the lines, while also including vignettes that explain how the Australian experience fitted into the wider experience of War.

By the time Carlyon came to writing this book, he had already written a book about the Gallipoli Campaign. I do wonder about the choice of title: The Great War to my mind, is somewhat misleading given the subject matter. For this book is strictly a campaign history of the Australian forces from Fromelles - their first foray on the Western front - to the final act of the AIF, the taking of Montbrehain in October 1918. For many people my age Carlyon is better remembered as a journalist who mostly wrote about horse racing. The cognitive dissonance of who I thought Carlyon was and the misleading title of this book took me a little time to overcome. While not a pedant (well maybe a bit), I think the title was poorly chosen, especially as there is no blurb or any other material to alert the reader to the fact that this book is not actually a history of the whole of World War One.

Once I understood the limits of this book, I found it a good read. Carlyon not only writes well about the battles that the Australians fought, but uses his journalistic skill to provide a flavour of what it must have been like, using extracts from diaries and letters to give the reader a sense of the horrors, but also of the personalities of the Australian troops. He has ended most chapters with a view of the battlefields in the present day, contrasting the generally bucolic countryside of the 21st century with the vision of hell that most of it was in 1916-1918.

Like all histories of Australian exploits in the Great War, Carlyon is following in the footsteps of Charles Bean. While Carlyon is not a doe-eyed admirer of the official historian, quite often criticizing his conclusions and his distaste for General Monash, he is influenced as all writers have been by Bean's magnum opus. The Great War is mostly a history from the Battalion level, a narrative of small actions within the wider War.

Carlyon is more readable than Bean, and does try to provide some context for the Australian battles. He intersperses his battlefield descriptions with short essays on the strategic outlook and the political intrigues that swirled around the British forces during the War. He has much to say about Haig, Gough, Plumer, Lloyd George, Nivelle, Foch and Clemenceau. Most of it is not very flattering, and suited to Carlyon's story of the war. This causes him some problems during the book: Plumer is a genius at modern battle, until he isn't, Haig is a tongue-tied nincompoop until he is a rock of determination, and so on. The wish to characterize people simply is something that Carlyon tries to avoid throughout the book, but sometimes he can't help himself and his journalistic desire for a good story overwhelms the more nuanced narrative that may be closer to the truth.

The one character he does map with some complexity is Monash. Carlyon shows us that he was almost certainly the ablest officer in the Australian forces, but also points out clearly that there were others, both British and Colonial, who were his equal. Not only did he lead masterstrokes such as Hamel but there were also times when he pushed his men too far with too little support. What Carlyon shows is that Monash not only had a great tactical mind, he also had the ruthlessness required to sacrifice lives when he felt is was necessary.

While Carlyon describes battles well, there is very little in The Great War about the lives of the troops behind the lines, except when it can add an amusing anecdote to bring out the nature of the troops. Carlyon's descriptions of the AIF tend to follow the template of an army that was short on barrack-room discipline, but good at fighting - the mythical Aussie digger. There is a kernel of truth to all myths, and there is no doubt that the AIF had a more democratic nature than the British army as a whole, but sometimes the good story takes over from the duller reality.

I feel like I'm writing a bad review for this book, which is not my intention. The Great War is a very well written account of the Australian battlefield experience on the Western Front. Carlyon does well to bring out the waste and horror of war, and his trope of ending the chapters with a description of the countryside as it is today, perhaps also describing the cemeteries in which some of the soldiers he writes about lay, evokes the pity of war as well as any book I have read. 

The advantage, if I can call it that, of writing a book from the battalion view is that the writer does not have to linger too much on what it was all for. The final few pages lay out the Australian achievement on the Western Front - considerable territory captured, some vital battles, and an honorable part played in a bigger picture. By the end of the war, the AIF was dangerously low on numbers (Carlyon writes pithily and well on the two conscription campaigns run in Australia during the war, as he also does more generally on the machinations of Billy Hughes as Prime Minister, and Keith Murdoch as stirrer), but as one of the most experienced corps of troops on the front, was in demand as a shock force. By the time of its last battle it was spent - the war ended not a moment too soon for the Australians.

If, as a reader, you would like to know about the battles Australia fought on the Western Front, I can recommend The Great War. It's well-written, and gives just enough context to what was going on so that the uninitiated can understand where the Australians fitted into the bigger picture. The maps included in this paperback edition were at best adequate, but there are endnotes, bibliography and a reasonable index.

The strength of the book is in Carlyon's evocation of the average soldier: he is successful in helping the reader get into - as much as one can - the shoes of those who were there. While Gallipoli has become the overarching military myth of Australia, most Australians who died in World War One did so on the Western Front - even the term "digger" was coined on that front in 1917. The lasting effects of the War trickle down to the present day: my Great-Grandfather was killed at Menin Road, one of his brothers was invalided home to Australia in the same year, another had already been killed at Lone Pine, and his other brother, one of the original ANZACS, and someone who participated in every battle listed in this book except the last, was sent home early, one of only 6,000 left from those men who landed at ANZAC Cove in 1915. Their memory, and the memory of the trauma that they suffered, lingered in the minds of the family they had left, and has been passed down to the present day.

I can recommend this book.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Operation Victory by Francis de Guingand

 Operation Victory by Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, 1942-43, Chief of Staff, 21st Army Group, 1944-45

London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947 (book read was fifth impression, 1949)

We all remember the saying that "behind every great man is a great woman". This book, by Montgomery's Chief of Staff, leads me to re-work the saying to state "behind every great General is a great Chief of Staff". De Guingand's book is not just a re-telling of the battles and campaigns he fought with Montgomery, the Eighth Army and the 21st Army Group, but is also an insight into what it takes to get armies equipped and in place to achieve those victories, and an evaluation of some of the personalities of the leadership of the Western Allies through defeat onward to victory.

Operation Victory is not really an autobiography - de Guingand does refer to his earlier military career in a chapter devoted to Montgomery, who was instrumental in getting de Guingand into the Staff College at Camberley - as the book begins with de Guingand's appointment as Military Assistant to Leslie Hore-Belisha, who was Secretary of State for War at the outbreak of World War II. De Guingand provides an insight into Hore-Belisha's personality, and a different view of the controversy that lead to his downfall: a case of misunderstanding, long-held grudges and preciousness by the military leading to the downfall of someone who, while trying to do what was right, did not have the diplomatic skills to achieve outcomes without friction.

Leaving the service of the Secretary of State after Hore-Belisha was dismissed, de Guingand ended up in the Middle East, firstly at the staff college at Haifa and then in the planning section in Cairo, going on to head up Military Intelligence for a time before moving onto the staff of the Eighth Army when Auchinleck was in charge. These were hard times for the British, with little equipment, few men and lots of territory to defend. De Guingand discusses the yo-yo-ing advances and retreats in the Western Desert, explaining that it was supply, rather than any particular military prowess, that was the cause of such movement. One side advanced until their supply-line became too stretched to be able to supply material in the amounts needed, while at the same time the other side was getting closer to its bases and therefore could be resupplied more quickly and efficiently. The British also suffered at this time owing to their great inferiority in armour - the early British tanks were no match for the German Panzers.

 While he liked Auchinleck, de Guingand thought that he was too easily swayed by others, which led to confusion in planning, and he was too quick to agree with his political masters when they wanted the army to do something, which brings us to the Greek Campaign. De Guingand, from a military point of view, explains that he thought the excursion to Greece was pretty much doomed to fail, and was a poorly thought-out political action, rather than any real attempt to foil an Axis invasion. While he does his job, it seems to de Guingand that the terrible earthquake he survived while in Greece portended what in fact came to be - the fairly quick defeat of the Allied troops in that country. Crete he sees as a continuation of that defeat, although those who have read Antony Beevor's book on that battle may have a different view of General Freyberg's abilities than does de Guingand.

In 1942, when the yo-yo left the Eighth Army at Alamein, a new character came onto the scene - Bernard Montgomery. Although de Guingand knew Montgomery quite well as they had crossed paths in the service between the wars, he describes his first meeting with the General - at a cross-roads outside Alexandria - in dramatic terms and was told by Montgomery "as you know, I will be making some changes shortly. If you happen to be one of them I will see that you get something good." De Guingand had expected to be let go by Montgomery, so this statement did not come as a surprise. Montgomery never mentioned it again, and the two stayed together until the end of the War.

In his description of the fighting in the Western Desert, de Guingand focusses on two things, which were the two most important from his point of view: supply, and co-operation with the Desert Air Force. Both of these activities were starting from a low base in Africa, and de Guingand, through his own drive, and through the selection of talented junior officers, had by the end of the campaign a very smoothly operating logistics branch, and had achieved a whole-of-force battle arrangement, with the Army and RAF closely co-operating to ensure victory. This arrangement continued into Sicily, and the Italian campaign.

Some of the most interesting parts of Operation Victory for me are when de Guingand discusses his view on the campaign plans that were devised at Supreme Headquarters, Montgomery's changes to the plans, and the discussions that occurred before a final agreement was reached. Sometimes he agreed with Montgomery, and sometimes he didn't. They were both in agreement that the initial plan for the invasion of Sicily was on too broad a front, but de Guigand disagreed with the British landings in the toe of Italy, feeling that it would have been more effective to land further up and cut off the Axis forces to the South. The Eighth Army found the going in Italy much harder than in the desert, with flanking opportunities limited by the geography, and the weather playing a much greater part in planning and execution of battles.

De Guingand left the Eighth Army along with Montgomery to begin the planning for the invasion of France. This was a huge logistical problem, which de Guingand describes well. Not only gathering the troops and training them, but working out what they needed, and as importantly when they needed it. This planning had to be undertaken without knowing for sure what the logistical arrangements could be: not knowing how many ports would be available to shipping and when they'd become available, likewise with airfields. Once ashore and advancing, the requirements of each army often meant that what may be desirable tactically had to wait until supply caught up with what was happening on the ground.

De Guingand downplays the disagreements between the high commanders, and has much praise for Eisenhower and Bedell Smith's handling of the invasion force. De Guingand disagreed with Montgomery's narrow thrust policy of invading the Ruhr, agreeing with Eisenhower and his broad thrust strategy. As de Guingand points out, there was no guarantee that a narrow thrust would bring about the surrender of Germany, and there was much risk in such a thrust actually being defeated. He does however see the thrust to Arnhem as a worthwhile attack - he never thought (as Montgomery did) that it would end the war more quickly, but it did drive a dagger into the German forces west of the Rhine, and made the push to that river easier. 

Towards the end, de Guingand met with Seyss-Inquart to organise humanitarian aid to the Dutch people, and to try and organise a surrender of German forces in Holland. While agreeing to the aid drops, Seyss-Inquart would not surrender. It was moot however, as it was not long before Germany collapsed, and de Guingand, from organising logistics for armies, was organising logistics for displaced peoples, German prisoners-of-war, and released Allied prisoners.

Operation Victory is a fascinating insight into the workings of some of the great Allied armies of World War II, from the technical and personal point of view. There are interesting portraits of many of the great leaders of that time, and I can see why it was a bestseller when it was published. Worth a look.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - War at the Top by James Leasor

 War at the Top by James Leasor, based on the experiences of General Sir Leslie Hollis 

London: The Companion Book Club, 1960

This was not quite the book I was expecting it to be. General Hollis, as described on the dust jacket of my copy, was "Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and was priveliged to sit in at most of the major policy discussions where the great decisions were made..." so I was expecting a detailed and incisive look at how these high-level committees worked, and the back-and-forth that went on before decisions were approved by the Government.

Instead, War at the Top reads like a fireside chat between Leasor and Hollis, where Hollis expounds on the personalities of those Generals and leaders that he dealt with, tells some juicy stories, and gives his opinions on the war, and politics, with a particular British conservatism. So, in many ways, this book left me wanting.

Having stated that, it was an enjoyable book to read, precisely because it was like sitting around a fire enjoying a whisky with a person full of anecdotes. No doubt with the benefit of considerable hind-sight, Hollis shows us how gullible Roosevelt was in believing Stalin, and how un-strategic the American top brass were in their failure to understand what their designs meant for post-war Europe. Much of this book's discussion of strategy has to do with the timing and location of the Second Front, and the battle between Churchill with his plans for a Mediterranean front centred on Italy and the Balkans, versus the American plan for a frontal attack on France. Leasor and Hollis paint Churchill as being strategically smart, but too scattered in his promotion of all sorts of schemes for attacks on Norway, Rhodes, or whatever else might have been flavour of the day with him.

The first part of the book bemoans the state of preparedness of Great Britain for war, and the efforts of the likes of Lord Beaverbrook to build up production quickly, against much opposition from not only the Labour Party, but also the Civil Service. Hollis is very much on Beaverbrook's side, bemoaning the state of unionism in England, and the unwillingness to go all out for victory. He also looks at the British commitment of arms to Russia, which came at a time when Britain itself was precariously short of arms and armour, and he shows how Churchill and Brooke clashed horns over this - politics versus military needs. Needless to say, the politics nearly always wins.

This book is perhaps less than the sum of its parts: enjoyable, but without any great insight into the war for the serious student of the conflict. In this reader's opinion it could have been much more.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell