Book Review - Good-Bye Dolly Gray by Rayne Kruger

 Good-Bye Dolly Gray: the Story of the Boer War by Rayne Kruger

London: Pan Books, 1974 (first published 1959)    ISBN 03300238612

Apart from (even in?) South Africa, how many of the combatant nations remember the Boer War of 1899-1902? My hometown has a magnificent memorial in the main street commemorating the 250 Victorians who died fighting in South Africa, but I'm sure most passers-by these days assume the memorial is to World War One if indeed they notice it at all.

The Boer War was the progenitor of many things: blockhouses and barbed wire entanglements, concentration camps, armoured trains, mounted infantry, and not least the participation of most of the Empire. Kruger's book, originally published when some combatants were still alive, is a good "traditional" narrative history of the conflict, covering the military and the political quite well, the social less so.

"The Boers said the war was for liberty. The British said it was for equality. The majority of the inhabitants, who were not white at all, gained neither liberty or equality." This quote from the final pages of the book is pithy, and is not far from the truth. The Great Trek, undertaken the generation previous to that fighting this war, was undertaken so that the Boers could maintain their independence from the British, who had taken the Cape Colony and Natal for their own. The Orange Free State and Transvaal were in nearly all senses independent states, which both sides found acceptable.

That is, until gold was discovered in the Transvaal. The rush brought many foreigners (Uitlanders) to the state, mainly British. Fearing loss of control, the Transvaal government restricted the franchise of non-Boers. The Uitlanders complained to the Crown. The British had long harboured a desire to unite their colonies with the Boer republics to create a South African state. They thought that supporting the Uitlanders in their claim for representation may be a way to achieve such an outcome via the franchise and demographic takeover. So, like many other wars and revolutions throughout history, the fundamental cause of the Boer War was essentially about taxation without representation.

Militarily, the British Empire was always going to win a long drawn-out struggle. The best the Boers could hope for was to make Britain pay such a price that they would make terms. Eventually this is basically what happened in 1902, when the Boers recognised the suzerainty of the English and South Africa became a reality, but the Boers maintained their culture and language and eventually gained political preponderance over the new territory via their own demographic takeover. The War spilled much blood and spent much treasure to only reach a position that could realistically have been negotiated.

The opposing military forces could not have been more different in 1899. The initial British force, under General Buller (whose reputation suffered an irretrievable collapse during this conflict owing to his caution and tactical blunders) might have been wearing khaki and carrying modern Lee Metford rifles, but were old-fashioned in other ways. Their huge columns, with baggage trains consisting of thousands of carts drawn by oxen, officers that ensured that they brought with them champagne, baths and other luxuries, were no match for the Boers. Boer mobile commandos, who lived off the land (supported by many residents), were incredibly mobile owing to their horsed infantry that travelled without impedimenta, and were tactically supple as everyone had a say in how battle was commenced and fought.

Unfortunately the unique structure of the Boer fighting force also became a weakness as the war developed. With no fixed military structure, Boers came and went from the battle-ground as they pleased, and each commando could decide to engage how it chose to, whether that supported Boer strategy or not.

The British eventually dominated the battlefield through combining two seemingly opposing principles, which they fused into a strategy which eventually brought the Boers to the negotiating table. The first was to create units that copied the Boer way of fighting: mobile columns of mounted infantry, lightly equipped, that could cover distance quickly to bring the enemy to heel. The second was the construction of thousands of blockhouses - small forts that linked together into a military fence across the country. By using the mobile columns to push the commandos onto the lines of blockhouses, the British eventually wore down the Boer forces so much that their will to continue fighting began to fail. The Boers had hoped since the start of the war that their cousins who lived in Cape Colony and Natal would rise in rebellion and support them. This support did not materialise even after the Boers "invaded" the Cape and caused much trouble there. This fact also helped seal the fate of the Boers.

The British, while eventually "winning", also paid a heavy price. As many wars have, the Boer War brought down a government, and also a way of governing. The many failures of both politics and military during the war led to the British public losing faith in the rule of the upper classes. The Liberals took over politics, and the British officer class, where commissions were bought rather than earned, was dismantled after the war by Kitchener, who was the modernising leader of the forces in South Africa.

Kruger's book lists a catalogue of military blunders, with the British consistently underestimating the capabilities of the Boers, and the Boers suffering from too much or too little caution, often failing to press home their advantage or fruitlessly attacking points that were too strong. Early in the war the Boers laid siege to Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberly. They failed to take any of these places, and if they had the war may have taken a different turn.

By the same token, if Buller had moved more decisively and had more tactical nous, the Boers may not have won their early victories and in fact might have suffered defeats that may have led to them putting down their rifles much earlier than they did.

Kruger spends a few chapters on the political aspects of the war, particularly in England, but glosses over the politics of the participation of the Empire in the war, as well as the politics of the Cape Colony and Natal during the conflict. While he describes the concentration camps, again it is a side-issue in this book to the descriptions of the military activity.

If you want to get a grip on the military progression of the Boer War, Good-Bye Dolly Gray (the title comes from a well-known song from the era) is not the worst place to start.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - The Scramble for Africa by Thomas Pakenham

The Scramble for Africa: 1876-1912 by Thomas Pakenham

London: Abacus, 1992 (first published 1991)    ISBN 0349104492

If ever there was an over-used phrase, it is "Tour de Force". I've probably over-used it myself over the years, along with everybody else. However, if any book truly deserved to have that phrase applied to it, it is surely this one.

Most of us of a certain age think we know the story of colonial Africa: Livingstone, Stanley and Brazza, Rhodes and the Boer War, and of course the horrors of the Congo. The fact that is most impressed on my mind after finishing this book is how quickly it all happened: Brazza helped discover the Congo for Europeans and lived to present a report on the horrors of the concession system there, while Lugard, who won Uganda for the British lived to see the outbreak of the Second World War.

So what did happen in those forty-odd years? Interestingly, most of the time is was not the activity of countries willingly expanding their empires, but (mostly) people chasing the almighty dollar that dragged Europe into the heart of Africa. Many of the colonies mentioned in Pakenham's book began as concessions for business interests, who were trying (and often failing) to make money from the land.

Until the advent of the Europeans, the main way money was generated in Central Africa was via the slave trade. While the Europeans ostensibly abhorred the trade and tried to stop it, in practice they often collaborated with the (mostly Arab) traders and turned a blind eye to the practice. In fact many of the companies effectively enslaved their workers while subjecting them to horrible punishments.

The attempt to abolish the slave trade was one step in brining to Africa Livingstone's three "Cs": Civilization, Christianity, and Commerce. "Civilization" was brought to the natives in the form of commissioners and troops to keep them in line, and sometimes education up to primary school level, but always suppression of native rights (and rites). "Christianity" came along and worked hand-in-glove with the civilizers, and often turned a blind eye to the excesses and atrocities that took place. "Commerce" mean that the Africans were expected to work for virtually nothing, getting "paid" in cheap consumer goods and useless fripperies.

Nothing that occurred during these years was good for the native populations of land taken over by Europe. And in fact not much good came from Africa for many Europeans. The enormous amounts of money expended on the colonies by the European powers was not expended on lifting their own poor out of misery, and many of the administrators and troops sent to Africa suffered long periods of isolation, usually disease and sometimes death. The only winners in the end were the businessmen, who usually found a way to at least get their money back, by selling out to their governments.

The question that this raises is why did governments condone, support and then take on these colonies? It is a good question to ask, and several answers can be attempted.

For England, the key to all its moves in Africa was - India. Strategically, England needed ports and way-stations to enable their Fleet - both naval and merchant - to traverse between India and "home". Hence their early occupation of Cape Colony and Natal. Once the Suez Canal was built it became strategically necessary for England to control Egypt as well. Then they needed to control the Nile, and so were drawn into the Sudan.

Further south, Rhodes's creation of his own state north of the Boer Republics meant that these intransigent people became a thorn in the side of British dominance, especially when it was becoming clear back in Europe that Germany was no longer a dependable friend of England. The fact that many inhabitants of the Cape were Boers added to the mix, and the result was the second Boer War (Pakenham also describes the First Boer War in detail).

For Germany and for France, Britain was the reason they made their moves in Africa, for the most part. France in particular tried to thwart British expansion in West Africa, often without a clear idea of strategic intent: the expedition to take Fashoda being a classic case-in-point.

Then there was Leopold II of Belgium. He wanted an empire because, well just because he wanted one, and he could afford to buy his own. The Congo became his personal fiefdom, a money-making exercise, and a catalogue of horrors that inspired Conrad's Heart of Darkness. The story of the exposure of the abuses that occurred in The Congo is a model of all the abuses that happened elsewhere as well - slaughter, dispossession, exploitation, cruelty, all in the name of personal and imperial aggrandisement.

Pakenham has written a gripping and readable story in this book, but it is by no means the complete story of Europeans in Africa: the Portuguese are hardly mentioned and Africa north of the Sahara is not a major part of the work. The focus is on Central Africa: the Niger and Congo, through to Uganda, Ethiopia and the south, with the Mahdi, Gordon and Kitchener thrown in for good measure.

The pathos of the story - the inevitable destruction of the local populations and ways of life - is well-related by Pakenham. The people that drove history forward in Africa: Stanley, Rhodes, Kruger, Brazza, Cetshwayo, Goldie, Jameson, Lugard, Morel, Menelik II, Mwanga, Carl Peters, Tippu Tip, and those in Europe that pulled the strings - Gladstone, Leopold, Salisbury, Chamberlain, Grey, Bismark, Delcasse are all delineated well and seem to speak with their own voice in the book.

The final chapter briefly covers the dissolution of these empires over an even shorter period (about 12 years) than it took to acquire them. The book (in the edition I read) has useful apparatus - good maps, a useful timeline and bibliography, as well as photographs of most of the leading players.

It's now over thirty years since this book was written, but if you want a (relatively) comprehensive overview of how Europe "ate" Africa, this book is well-worth reading.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - England's Pride by Julian Symons

 England's Pride: the story of the Gordon Relief Expedition by Julian Symons

London: White Lion Publishers, 1974 (first published by Hamish Hamilton 1965)

ISBN 085617548X

Many years ago I, like tens of thousands of other Melburnians, emerged from the underground railway station at Parliament and walked past a statue of General Gordon on my way to work. Paid for by public subscription, it is an indicator of how shocking to the Empire his death was, and in how much esteem he was held. I wonder how many commuters today even know who he is?

Certainly in 1884 everyone in England knew him - a hero from his service in China, and seen as a moral exemplar owing to his efforts to eradicate slavery in Africa, "Chinese" Gordon seems the quintessential Victorian hero - doing good work in far-flung places, wildly eccentric, and a favourite of the Queen.

Gordon ended up in the Sudan mainly owing to Gladstone's unwillingness to spend money on a military intervention there. In fact he had decided that the Anglo-Egyptian force in Khartoum should be withdrawn, rather than face the forces of the Mahdi, who's rebellion was gathering strength. The newspapers were pushing for a relief force to be sent, but the Government decided that they could just send Gordon, hoping his cachet would be enough to enable an orderly withdrawal, assuage public opinion, and curtail any unnecessary expense.

Unfortunately for Gladstone and his government, Gordon was a poor choice for such an assignment. Firstly, Gordon was a Christian visionary: hardly a good choice to try and pacify an Islamic insurgency. Secondly, he followed his own path, revealed to him by God, as he thought. Sent to arrange a retreat he instead fortified Khartoum and set himself to withstand a siege.

Soon enough he was surrounded by Mahdist forces, and it was public opinion - whipped up again by the newspapers - that forced the Government to send an expedition to relieve Gordon and bring him safely back to Egypt. If the Mahdi was defeated in the process, all the better.... so much for saving money!

England's Pride is the story of the expeditionary force that was sent up the Nile to relieve Gordon: a story of success and failures, of battles and massacres, and of Victorian attitudes and characters such as Generals Wolseley, Buller and Stewart, Colonels Barnaby and Butler, Lord Charles Beresford and most famous probably today Kitchener, who played a minor but important role in what came to pass in 1884-5.

Once Gladstone was finally convinced that rescue of Gordon was needed, the army decided the best course of action was to trans-ship the force up the Nile in small whaling boats to a forward base at Korti, and then send a force across the desert on camel to Metemmeh before continuing on to Khartoum.

The story therefore is mainly one of logistics and movement rather than fighting: the logistics and movement were in fact bigger obstacles to the army than any of the Arab warriors that they met on the battlefield. Moving thousands of men up the Nile over multiple cataracts (some of which were at the time un-mapped) was a huge undertaking, requiring mammoth efforts not only from the troops themselves, by the boatbuilders who built over 400 whalers in quick time, and also the Canadian guides (voyageurs) who were employed to manoeuvre the boats up the river safely to their destination (which in great part they managed).

The provision of camels proved to be a major problem. There were never enough for the army's needs and those they did have became severely over-worked. In fact one of the main reasons that reprisal against the Mahdi's forces for his sack of Khartoum (which occurred two days before the first British steamer came in sight of the town) was discontinued was that the British had too few camels to engage in effective campaigning.

Symons maps all this out well, and also provides a good synopsis of the final days of Gordon and the battle of Abu Klea. He charts the fate of those involved in the expedition - who prospered and who didn't, and a useful chapter speculating whether there was any chance that relief of Gordon was ever a realistic prospect. Symons thinks that those who became scapegoats at the time were unfairly treated and concludes that if anyone was to blame, it was Gordon for not communicating his position effectively enough to Wolseley, and Gladstone for delaying his decision to send a relief force. Wolseley's army, all things considered, did about as well as it could have in the situation.

What struck me most in this retelling of a great Victorian epic was how the situation rings through the ages - vacillating politicians and bickering military leaders leading to disaster is a story as old as time, and as recent and tomorrow's news.

England's Pride is a solid exposition of an interesting, if now semi-forgotten, piece of Empire history.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Rorke's Drift by Michael Glover

 Rorke's Drift: a Victorian Epic by Michael Glover

London: Leo Cooper, 1975                                                ISBN 0850521823

This book has exceed expectations for me: I often find Leo Cooper/Pen&Sword books can be very militarily "geeky", diving down the rabbit-holes of equipment or drill, minute descriptions of tactical movements, which make the books of value only if the reader already has broader knowledge of the incident or battle in question. Thankfully Rorke's Drift does not fall into that category.

Although this is a short book (less than 150 pages) Glover has not only given us a blow-by-blow description of the action at Rorke's Drift, but also a close description of the disaster at Isandhlwana earlier in the day, and a concise exposition of the history of Southern Africa that had led to the situation where Cetshwayo's Impis attacked the British after they had crossed the Buffalo River into Zululand.

Glover well describes how it was as much British public opinion at home as it was activity on the ground that drove the British to expand their hold on Natal, which impinged on the Boers and also the Zulus, who were finding that the Boers were impinging on their land. The Zulu tribe had emerged as a successful warrior force, and their social structure almost required them to engage in battle (warriors had to have "washed their spears" in blood before they could marry).

In the clashes between Zulu and Boer, the British, given the times, naturally leaned toward supporting the white man over the black, and so gave an ultimatum to Cetshwayo to disband his army, something that he couldn't and wouldn't contemplate. That ultimately was the reason Chelmsford crossed the Buffalo in January 1879.

Glover explains quite clearly how the Zulus defeated the British at Isandhlwana - a combination of poor leadership, and poor use of the country doomed the British column - in open ground and in loose formation, less than two thousand British troopers armed with Martini-Henry rifles could not but succumb to an estimated 15,000 Zulu warriors. Conversely, in a well-led defense of a well-fortified position, approximately 150 British troopers could fight off 4,000 Zulus. Glover explains that it was much safer for the garrison to stay put than try to run, as in the open all the advantages lay with the Zulu warriors, but in a fortified position, the advantage lay with the British.

I won't go into the detail of Glover's description of both battles, other than to state they are well-written, clear, and concise. Along the way he puts paid to some of the images that might be in the reader's head from the movie Zulu (although the battle scenes do ring true). Bromhead was not young, and he and Chard worked well together from the start. The 24th Foot was a regiment of experienced and hardened soldiers. And Private Hook, far from being a shirker, was an out-and-out hero during the battle (and he was also in real life teetotal!).

Glover's final chapter looks at the politics surrounding the battle - the heroic stand at Rorke's Drift covered up for the disaster at Isandhlwana and so was boosted by those who's careers could have been ended by the loss of the first battle. There is no doubt that incredible heroism was shown by the members of the garrison, but one wonders whether the award of eleven VCs wasn't at least in part influenced by factors other than those which occurred during the Battle. Glover also makes clear the heroism of the Zulu warriors, who time after time flung themselves forward into a rain of bullets.

So, if you want a short history of the battle, and one that sets it in full context, and is good reading, I can recommend this book.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Mussolini's War by John Gooch

 Mussonlini's War: Fasicst Italy from Triumph to Collapse 1935-1943 by John Gooch

London: Penguin, 2020                                                              ISBN 9780141980294

This is a tale of woe: a case of a country that didn't have the means to undertake a war of conquest, but owing to a prideful dictator and generals who were too scared to say no (and who were fond of glory), embarked not only on colonial expansion in Africa, but also fought in Europe and Russia. The result, as John Gooch shows in this wonderful book, was never in doubt. Italy could never have won, even if they had limited their greed to the Balkans, let alone Greece, Russia and their African empire.

Mussolini's War is at base a military history of Fascist Italy, which shows quite clearly that it was not necessarily the military efficiency of Italy that was the problem (although it was a problem), it was the paucity of Italy's economic and natural resources that crippled all efforts by Italy on the battlefield. This paucity combined lethally with the personality of Mussolini, who was determined to re-create Italy as a great power, not only with his African empire, but also as a power to effect changes in the body politic of Europe.

Gooch begins this book with the invasion and conquest of Abyssinia, and shows that even in this military adventure, the Italian military and economy struggled to keep the army in the field. His adventure in Spain drained the well even further, without much to show for it. Economists explained to Mussolini and the generals that the country could in no way take part in a general European war until at least 1944, as it would take that long to get enough equipment made to equip the army. Mussolini not only agreed with that assessment, but assured his generals that nothing would happen in Europe until at least then, because it would take Germany that long to equip as well. Of course, Hitler could not contain his aggression, and war came much earlier in 1939.

At first Italy kept aloof from the conflict, based on its inability to equip itself. However after the quick German victories, Mussolini began to worry that an Italy that hadn't participated would be left out of any reckoning after a German victory. This led Italy to get involved in the Balkans, where they had already taken Albania after a war that didn't go entirely their way. Greece and Yugoslavia not only exposed the poor equipment of the Italian army, but also the lack of an effective officer corps. Needing Germany to help finish the job did nothing for Mussolini's ego, and led directly to him offering troops for Hitler's invasion of Russia.

The lack of equipment for Italian troops was chronic from the start, and never got better - the industrial capacity of Italy could from 1940-1943 barely keep pace with losses of Army equipment, let alone build up the Air Force and Navy. Italy spent almost its entire war going cap-in-hand to Germany to ask for raw materials and equipment to enable it to fight. The lack of equipment actually crippled Italy's ability to fight effectively : its armies couldn't maneuvre owing to the lack of transport, and when it did fight it struggled with ancient artillery and a lack of automatic weapons. The Air Force did not have enough aircraft to complete the tasks assigned to it, and the Navy didn't even have enough fuel oil to participate in the War at all in 1943.

The logistic problems did not end there - the capacity of the ports in North Africa was too small to enable proper re-supply of the Italian forces in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and Italy had no means to supply its East African colonies. Abyssinia was left to its own devices, and was destroyed by the Allies, and in North Africa Italy once again suffered Germanic take-over of their military effort. While Italy supplied most of the men in North Africa, men were not enough, especially when faced with the increasing all-arms co-operation that the Allies were perfecting.

While we may think of Italy as "Germany - lite", Gooch explains that, in the Balkans, Italy was not beyond massacring the local populace and burning whole villages. Both in the Balkans and Greece Italy was a ruthless conqueror, depriving Greece of food and leaving thousands to starve, and ruling its Balkan provinces with a first of iron. While it can be shown that Italian rule was not quite as disastrous for local populations in these areas as was German, it was far from benevolent.

Mussolini's adventurism finally caught up with him in 1943, when the Allies attacked Italian soil for the first time. While the Generals and the King had been sanguine about their relationship with Germany up until now, they realised that their future lay in surrender and a change of sides, something that would have been impossible with the Duce at the helm. Once they had got rid of him, the problem then became how to deal with a Germany that was determined to fight on in Italy, no matter what the government thought.

As a well-researched and well-written account of all these events, I think it would be hard to find a book in English that would surpass Mussolini's War. As someone who thinks they know quite a bit about World War II, I learnt a lot more from reading this book. While the maps in this book are merely serviceable, the other apparatus in this book are excellent - comprehensive notes, wonderful bibliography and good index. Recommended.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Lords of the Atlas by Gavin Maxwell

Lords of the Atlas : the rise and fall of the House of Glaoua, 1893-1956 by Gavin Maxwell

London: Longmans, 1966

I guess when most people think about Morocco, they think of beaches, holidays, and maybe the life of literary types who spent time there. Or perhaps the movie Casablanca. That, and a vague knowledge that there has been a low level insurrection that has been going on in the South of the country for the whole of my life, is pretty much the sum of my knowledge of the country.

Gavin Maxwell on the other hand is probably best known for his books on raising and protecting otters in Scotland - I was set Ring of bright water as a text in my schooldays, a book I enjoyed a lot. What he has written here is history of a sort: he's taken the life of Thami El Glaoui as the centrepoint to look at the history of Morocco in the first half of the twentieth century, and written a satisfying tale of greed, power, and tragedy that works well for those who don't know too much background to the story.

Morocco in the late nineteenth century was much as it had been for hundreds of years - the Sultan, based in the North of the country for the most part, was nominal ruler of all of Morocco, but really had little real power beyond the foothills of the Atlas Mountains. These areas were ruled by ambitious families, one of which was the Glaoua. In 1893 the Sultan passed through the Glaoua's territories with his army in a bad way, leaving his antiquated cannon in possession of Madani El Glaoui as he traversed the Atlas back to Rabat. This cannon, the only one in Morocco not in the Sultan's control, enabled the Glaoui to dominate neighbouring tribes.

Maxwell, in describing the rise of Madani and Thami from minor tribal chieftains to kingmakers and powerful warlords, passes briefly over the history of the Sultans, making much of the brutality of the times, and of the gradual French incursion into the country. He shows how World War One led the French to rely more and more on people such as The Glaoui to enforce their colonial policy, and how The Glaoui was only to happy to help, as this alliance enhanced his power and territorial control in the South.

He makes much of The Glaoui's popularity in Europe (particularly England and France) in the 30s, something that history has erased, but possibly similar to the Aga Khan in later times. People travelled to his court as a sort of adventure tourism, which The Glaoui was happy to encourage. Meanwhile Thami ran his fiefdom in the traditional way, with hundreds of concubines, possibly over a hundred children, and many of his subjects and enemies rotting in his vast dungeons.

Having raised his standard alongside the French, Thami had no time for any members of the burgeoning independence movement - his concern over Sultan Mohammed V's support for independence led him to organise a coup to replace him, which was supported by the French. Unfortunately the people of Morocco didn't support the change of ruler, and unrest increased. After the second assassination attempt on his life, the new Sultan lost interest, and the French began to realise that they would be better off re-instating Mohammed V. This meant betraying the trust of Thami El Glaoui, which he felt keenly, even as cancer was beginning a concerted effort on his life.

In almost his final act, Thami prostrated himself before the re-instated Sultan, and died soon after. Not long after that, his family were dispossessed of their land, money and titles, much as happened in previous centuries.

Maxwell has written an entertaining history, written as a tragedy, and none the worse for that. This is not the book to turn to for a thorough history of Morocco, but as an insight into a particular era, it's a good read, and the photographs and drawings throughout the text add to the atmosphere.

Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell