Book Review - Good-Bye Dolly Gray by Rayne Kruger

 Good-Bye Dolly Gray: the Story of the Boer War by Rayne Kruger

London: Pan Books, 1974 (first published 1959)    ISBN 03300238612

Apart from (even in?) South Africa, how many of the combatant nations remember the Boer War of 1899-1902? My hometown has a magnificent memorial in the main street commemorating the 250 Victorians who died fighting in South Africa, but I'm sure most passers-by these days assume the memorial is to World War One if indeed they notice it at all.

The Boer War was the progenitor of many things: blockhouses and barbed wire entanglements, concentration camps, armoured trains, mounted infantry, and not least the participation of most of the Empire. Kruger's book, originally published when some combatants were still alive, is a good "traditional" narrative history of the conflict, covering the military and the political quite well, the social less so.

"The Boers said the war was for liberty. The British said it was for equality. The majority of the inhabitants, who were not white at all, gained neither liberty or equality." This quote from the final pages of the book is pithy, and is not far from the truth. The Great Trek, undertaken the generation previous to that fighting this war, was undertaken so that the Boers could maintain their independence from the British, who had taken the Cape Colony and Natal for their own. The Orange Free State and Transvaal were in nearly all senses independent states, which both sides found acceptable.

That is, until gold was discovered in the Transvaal. The rush brought many foreigners (Uitlanders) to the state, mainly British. Fearing loss of control, the Transvaal government restricted the franchise of non-Boers. The Uitlanders complained to the Crown. The British had long harboured a desire to unite their colonies with the Boer republics to create a South African state. They thought that supporting the Uitlanders in their claim for representation may be a way to achieve such an outcome via the franchise and demographic takeover. So, like many other wars and revolutions throughout history, the fundamental cause of the Boer War was essentially about taxation without representation.

Militarily, the British Empire was always going to win a long drawn-out struggle. The best the Boers could hope for was to make Britain pay such a price that they would make terms. Eventually this is basically what happened in 1902, when the Boers recognised the suzerainty of the English and South Africa became a reality, but the Boers maintained their culture and language and eventually gained political preponderance over the new territory via their own demographic takeover. The War spilled much blood and spent much treasure to only reach a position that could realistically have been negotiated.

The opposing military forces could not have been more different in 1899. The initial British force, under General Buller (whose reputation suffered an irretrievable collapse during this conflict owing to his caution and tactical blunders) might have been wearing khaki and carrying modern Lee Metford rifles, but were old-fashioned in other ways. Their huge columns, with baggage trains consisting of thousands of carts drawn by oxen, officers that ensured that they brought with them champagne, baths and other luxuries, were no match for the Boers. Boer mobile commandos, who lived off the land (supported by many residents), were incredibly mobile owing to their horsed infantry that travelled without impedimenta, and were tactically supple as everyone had a say in how battle was commenced and fought.

Unfortunately the unique structure of the Boer fighting force also became a weakness as the war developed. With no fixed military structure, Boers came and went from the battle-ground as they pleased, and each commando could decide to engage how it chose to, whether that supported Boer strategy or not.

The British eventually dominated the battlefield through combining two seemingly opposing principles, which they fused into a strategy which eventually brought the Boers to the negotiating table. The first was to create units that copied the Boer way of fighting: mobile columns of mounted infantry, lightly equipped, that could cover distance quickly to bring the enemy to heel. The second was the construction of thousands of blockhouses - small forts that linked together into a military fence across the country. By using the mobile columns to push the commandos onto the lines of blockhouses, the British eventually wore down the Boer forces so much that their will to continue fighting began to fail. The Boers had hoped since the start of the war that their cousins who lived in Cape Colony and Natal would rise in rebellion and support them. This support did not materialise even after the Boers "invaded" the Cape and caused much trouble there. This fact also helped seal the fate of the Boers.

The British, while eventually "winning", also paid a heavy price. As many wars have, the Boer War brought down a government, and also a way of governing. The many failures of both politics and military during the war led to the British public losing faith in the rule of the upper classes. The Liberals took over politics, and the British officer class, where commissions were bought rather than earned, was dismantled after the war by Kitchener, who was the modernising leader of the forces in South Africa.

Kruger's book lists a catalogue of military blunders, with the British consistently underestimating the capabilities of the Boers, and the Boers suffering from too much or too little caution, often failing to press home their advantage or fruitlessly attacking points that were too strong. Early in the war the Boers laid siege to Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberly. They failed to take any of these places, and if they had the war may have taken a different turn.

By the same token, if Buller had moved more decisively and had more tactical nous, the Boers may not have won their early victories and in fact might have suffered defeats that may have led to them putting down their rifles much earlier than they did.

Kruger spends a few chapters on the political aspects of the war, particularly in England, but glosses over the politics of the participation of the Empire in the war, as well as the politics of the Cape Colony and Natal during the conflict. While he describes the concentration camps, again it is a side-issue in this book to the descriptions of the military activity.

If you want to get a grip on the military progression of the Boer War, Good-Bye Dolly Gray (the title comes from a well-known song from the era) is not the worst place to start.

Cheers for now, from

A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Before the ANZAC Dawn edited by Craig Stockings and John Connor

Before the ANZAC Dawn : a military history of Australia to 1915

Edited by Craig Stockings and John Connor

Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2013                                 ISBN 9781742233697

So often here in Australia we think of our military history starting on the shores of ANZAC Cove on the morning of the 25th of April 1915, when actually it began at least one hundred years before, and even further back depending on how the term 'military history' is used.

This book is an interesting collection of essays that look at incidents in and themes that run through Australia's military history before that fateful April morning. The first two essays deal with Aboriginal warfare between tribes, and with the white settlers. Aboriginal societies were warrior societies, and while some of the fighting was ceremonial it was no less real for that. Historians are still peeling back the layers of evidence as to exactly how and why the tribes fought each other. Our developing understanding of the fighting between Aboriginals and the white settlers is well-covered by the second essay in the book. What was openly stated at the time and then repressed for many years is now being spoken of again, with evidence to back it up: namely that many groups of Aboriginals fought the wave of settlers - sometimes with (temporary) success - before finally succumbing to superior numbers and firepower.

The next essays in the book then go on to elaborate a few themes: firstly Britain's desire for Australia to shoulder more of the cost of their own defence, and for Australian defence assets to be at the Empire's disposal when needed. This contrasted with Australia's lack of willingness (and financial ability) to spend on her own defence, with the tangled history of rifle clubs and the cadet movement laying bare the divide between the military requirement of trained and drilled troops, and the average citizen's view that a few crack shots with their own horses would save the day with their "natural" soldierly ability, an idea that was seemingly reinforced by the Australian experience in the Boer War. The idea of citizens doing what was needed when the time came is further expounded upon in the essay dealing with the "invasion literature" that was produced in the late 1800s, spurred by the departure of English troops from the continent, and the seeming unwillingness of the Royal Navy to commit to defending Australia come what may.

Further essays discuss the issues that arose once Australia federated in 1901, which meant that she had to create her own defence forces. The Navy was ahead of the Army in professionalisation, but compulsory military training - which was instituted in 1911 - at least allowed the government to draw on men who had a modicum of training when it was time to gather troops for World War One. This was a big step from Australian's earlier involvement in the New Zealand Wars, the Sudan or even the Boer War, where units were raised by individual colonies without much co-ordination, or it was left to individuals to join up.

The final essay deals with Australia's first military action in World War One; the capture of the German radio station at Rabaul. The previous essay's description of the struggles to get a national defence off the the ground find their apogee here: the German East Asiatic Squadron was too fearful to defend Rabaul owing to the superior firepower of Australia's nascent Navy, and troops were gathered and sent to fight within a month of War being declared.

Overall the essays in this book are interesting and educative: backed with comprehensive notes and useful bibliographies they are each a great starting point for entry into Australia's early military history.

Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Zombie Myths of Australian Military History

Zombie Myths of Australian Military History edited by Craig Stockings

Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2010        ISBN 9781742230795

I hope this book sold well - while it didn't really drop any bombshells on my understanding of the subjects it covered, it is a good corrective to the self-serving pap that is sometimes dished up to readers and called "History". Ranging across two hundred years of Australia and warfare, the essays in this book remind the reader that sometimes the story that gets told is not only not quite the truth, it's not even the truth.

The ten essays in this collection are written by different authors, and as such the quality does vary, but overall they hit their mark very well. Writing as I am in 2019, it is interesting that some of the myths in this book (published in 2010) have in fact been laid to rest in the intervening decade. The first chapter, about the concept of a Frontier War, is a case in point. John Connor points out that not only did Aboriginals fight each other, but they also did quite often fight the settlers and British Army who came onto their land: this fact is now much more accepted today than when this essay was written, and there would be few that would today deny that a state of warfare, however one might define the term, existed on the frontiers of the settled areas of this Continent.

Not all myths do die, and the authors of the next few chapters are fighting an uphill battle to convince the public of the truth. The story of Breaker Morant, which is covered in chapter two, is a fine example of fiction overtaking history, with the successful Bruce Beresford film - which was more fiction than fact - becoming the default story of a man who was by turns conman, drunkard and murderer.

And then there is World War One, where the myth of the Australian Digger was truly born, and where story upon story has been laid down like a geological deposit, and one must sift through the false to get to the real. The reasons for this are varied, with propaganda being a major source of many myths and - especially in the carnage of the Western Front - trying to give sense to the senseless. Rhys Crawley's chapter on the August offensive at Gallipoli smashes quite a few myths, with a very thorough and reasoned argument that the offensive was doomed to fail no matter what the British did at Suvla. This chapter for me underlines how and why the myths develop. My great-great uncle was killed at the Battle of Lone Pine, and another took part in the battle and survived. It's only natural that the loved ones of those who pay the ultimate sacrifice want to know that they died as part of something worthwhile, and that they had a chance of success, and if that success is elusive it's not their fault. On all these feelings myths grow; growing on grief, anger, and belief.

The next couple of chapters are much more specific in their outlook, with Elizabeth Greenhalgh showing that Australians weren't the first to breach the Hindenburg Line, which is correct, but it's also clear that the Australian Corp was an important part of the final offensive, and Craig Stockings, through a detailed look at the Desert Campaign against Italian troops, shows that it is training and logistics which make effective troops, not some mythical idea of the bronzed Aussie being a natural soldier.

The highlight of the book for me was the chapter on the loss of HMAS Sydney II. This chapter shows how advances in technology destroy myths. It has always been clear to those who work with a historical mindset that there was no conspiracy about the loss of the Sydney: it was a tragedy that was possibly avoidable, but Peter Dennis describes very well why Captain Burnett may have gotten too close to the Kormoran, thus sealing Sydney's fate. Of all Australian military events, the loss of the Sydney has been the source of the most ridiculous rumour-mongering and cockamamie theories; partly in reaction to the immense tragedy of losing over 600 men, and partly that the myth of Australian military prowess couldn't allow the Sydney to be destroyed by a mere raider. Dennis scythes through all the theories, and hopes that the recent discovery of the wrecks may help to put them to rest. It has.

The two chapters that deal with our war against the Japanese show how governments can create myths when they think it's in their interests to do so. That Japan never planned to invade Australia is quite clear. That politicians and soldiers at the time talked about the possibility is understandable. What is less forgivable is the creation of "Battle for Australia" day, which suggests that the invasion was a possibility, and has skewed the history of what actually happened to fit a political agenda. Likewise the idea that Japan was stopped on the Kokoda Trail is dealt with in a logical and documented manner. No-one doubts the bravery of the troops that fought there, but it was the Japanese pulling back from the Trail after the Allied forces threatened their rear bases, rather than any particular battle on the Trail itself, that was the catalyst for them turning back.

Jeffrey Grey's essay on Vietnam shows the reader how some myths can badly affect those that are the subject of mythologising, pointing out that service in Vietnam was no more or less dangerous than other wars, both in the field and in what returned servicemen suffered after they got home. The final essay covers Australia's troubled relationship with East Timor, having invaded in World War Two when they didn't want us there, and in 1999 being very reluctant to save them from the depredations of the Indonesians when they did want us, with governments on both occasions painting us as heroes saving the day.

I'd recommend this book in anyone interested in Australian military history, no matter how much you know. For those that know little, it is an education, and for those that know a lot there is still something of interest to be gained from its pages.

Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell

Book Review - Closed File by Kit Denton

Closed File by Kit Denton

Adelaide: Rigby, 1983           ISBN 072701739X

Kit Denton is most famous for his novel The Breaker, a fictionalized account of the life and trial of Breaker Morant and the atrocities of the Bushveldt Carbineers. When it was made into a popular movie by Bruce Beresford, awareness of the incident was heightened, which allowed Denton to spend more time and money on his researches. A little chastened that his fiction was being taken for fact (The Breaker used much artistic licence to create a good story), he wrote Closed File to try and set the record straight.

Set the record straight it (mostly) does, but that has not stopped many Australians to continue to clamor for a posthumous pardon for Morant, Handcock and the others based, it seems, on the fictional version of events. One wonders if these people have delved deeply into the evidence surrounding the incident.

The story of Morant, Handcock, and the Bushveldt Carbineers is fascinating, and it is easy to see why it makes such great fodder for film and fiction. By the time this unit was formed, the Boer War had entered its final, most brutal, phase. The Boers who were still fighting had retreated to the outer edges of the colony, and were mainly carrying out guerrilla-style attacks on British columns, trains, and collaborating farmers. The British were pushing the Boers further into the country, employing scorched-earth tactics to deprive them of supplies, and moving the population into the first-ever concentration camps.

The war had moved beyond set-piece battles and marching armies: the British had begun to fight fire with fire, forming small units of horse-borne troops, who lived out bush and tried to beat the Boer Commandos at their own game. These units often consisted of a preponderance of Colonials - Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans and Canadians - owing to these troop's superior bushcraft and horse handling skills. As the Colonial contingent's initial sign-on period drew to a close, those who wanted to stay signed on with these newly-formed units, which soon became filled with those who wished to continue fighting.

The Bushveldt Carbineers was an even more murky unit: formed and funded by businessmen in Pietersburg, its main task was to protect the railway lines in the area. It was not an official unit of the British Army - its members wore no insignia - and, operating in the rough and remote country of the Spelonken, oversight of its activities was limited.

The main actors in this drama centre around Harry Harbord Morant - "The Breaker". The main reason the incident is remembered at all is due to Morant's bush exploits and verse, which had garnered a following in Australia after his repeated publication, especially in The Bulletin. With mysterious origins (about which Denton can only speculate), Morant drank, gambled and versified his way through country Australia from Queensland to South Australia, from where he signed up with the South Australian Mounted Rifles for service in South Africa. It seems that he had a good time while serving with this unit, enjoying many "extra-curricular" activities, but at the end of his enlistment when he took a free passage to England, received a letter of commendation from his Commanding Officer.

Soon enough he was back in South Africa, to join the Bushveldt Carbineers with his good friend Frederick Hunt. It was Hunt's death and mutilation at the hands of a Boer unit that changed Morant's behaviour completely. That he "court-martialled" Visser and had him shot, and that he shot Boer prisoners was never denied. That he organised for Heese and Van Buren to be killed is highly probable - Handcock admitted to Witton that he shot Heese - and so even though it can be said Morant might have been provoked, it's clear that Morant, Handcock, Witton and Picton were guilty of heinous crimes.

Their defence at the trials - that they were following orders, and that other units had done similar things - was as spurious then as it would be now. In fact, members of the Bushveldt Carbineers refused to take part in such atrocities at the time. It is also hard to sustain the claims of British conspiracy and cover-up. The claim has been made that these men were scapegoats for all British atrocities, in a bid to try and improve relations with Germany, which was outraged especially by Heese's death (Heese was a German national). Denton points out that Morant and Handcock were acquitted of that charge. Denton shows that, as far as can be known, the trials were conducted properly, and the fact that the case files are no longer extant is down to the record-keeping protocols of the time, not some dastardly plot by the British. The discrepancies that are harder to fathom are the discrepancies in sentences, with Captain Taylor escaping punishment.

There was a controversy at the time in Australia, but it was not about the question of guilt or innocence, but that the newly-minted Australian Government was not consulted about the trial of its nationals. Australia had become a nation during the war, and it's clear that the British military leaders failed to take this political fact into account.

It remains to state that all war is hell, and that all lives lost in war are tragic losses. If we believe in the concept of just action in war, it's clear that fighters on both sides in South Africa were guilty of atrocities: the fact that others didn't face justice for their crimes does not mean that the sentence handed out in the Bushveldt Carbineers incident was in any way unjust.

For a clear-headed and informative guide to this incident, Closed File is worth reading.

Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell